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Abstract
The dissertation includes four individual essays that are laid out over four
separate chapters. Following a short overall introduction in Chapter 1, Chap-
ter 2 models the strategic interaction between two agents who engage in
a game-theoretical contest and hold expectation-based reference-dependent
preferences. We show, that agents who find themselves disadvantaged ex
ante, in this setting end up as favourites in two out of three possible equilibria.
In Chapter 3 we investigate, using field data, whether it is possible to invest in
non-cognitive ability through an educational policy. We measure the impact
of a study abroad experience on non-cognitive skills and compute its mone-
tary implications using wage data from the German Socio-Economic Panel.
The project presented in Chapter 4 is an outcome of initiating the study
series Fachkraft 2020 which is, at the moment of writing, the biggest student
survey in Germany with more than 40,000 annual participants. Based on
about 23,000 student responses we examine whether there is selection and
change of non-cognitive abilities in different study tracks of German higher
education. We find sizeable selection, but little change. Lastly, Chapter 5
models the impact of the internationalisation of higher education on eco-
nomic growth in a two country setting. We provide conditions necessary for
internationalisation to be beneficent and simulate different growth paths for
both countries.
Parts of this thesis have been published in the following articles:
• Bergerhoff, Borghans, Seegers, and van Veen (2013)
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When I left home and moved to England to attend school there, this was a big
change. Meeting these new people, teachers and kids alike, had a profound
impact on me. Before moving to England I wanted to study law. When I
came back I enrolled in economics.
One could argue that understanding a decision like this is not a function
of economics and that economists, who have set themselves a task difficult
enough, should leave it to other disciplines. Yet decisions of individuals
or groups are at the heart of economic models. Real outcomes, be it in
small markets or in the economy as a whole, are the product of both chance
and individual decisions, some of which are based on rational calculations,
but others are based on heuristics, personality traits, or reference points (a
clearly non-exhaustive list). In economic theory, agents confronted with a
decision pick the option that maximises their utility. On a meta level, this
is a satisfactory concept since utility can be derived from almost anything.
But when trying to tune in on actual human utility, economists struggle to
sort and combine the various potential sources of human motivation. As a
result, such “non-orthodox” preferences are, if they are, typically introduced
to economic theory in isolation and one at a time.
An interesting class of non-standard motives are reference-dependent pref-
erences. The concept that received much attention following the article of
Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) reflects the empirical finding that one is particu-
larly happy when an event exceeds expectations and particularly sad when
something falls short.1 Next to its intuitive appeal, modelling reference point
formation explicitly could help provide a more unified framework for differ-
ence sources of motivation.2 However, adding reference-dependent prefer-
ences to the classical utility makes the agent more complex to model.
1This is an example for expectation based reference points. However, reference points
can also be influenced by other factors like a social norm or a status quo.
2Schwerter (2013) for example finds that people have social reference points that can
explain their inequity aversion.
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But introducing such agents to existing economic models potentially changes
their predictions and produces new results. The model studied in Chapter
2 of this thesis exemplifies this.3 Two agents engage in a tournament and
face a difficult decision: Spending more effort than the opponent increases
the probability of winning a prize, but effort is unpleasant and hence to be
avoided. Finding a set of effort levels such that both agents cannot individ-
ually improve their position (an equilibrium) can be hard. To get solutions
agents are taken to be simple, i.e., they receive the same utility from the prize
and suffer the same disutility from spending effort. We extend this classical
set of motivations (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) and allow them to be affected by
their own expectations about the likelihood of winning.
Even when both agents are exactly identical reference-dependence allows
for multiple equilibria. However, when the game is unsymmetric, i.e. one
player has head-start, then in two out of three equilibria the person behind
spends more effort and is actually more likely to win. The model presents
one possible rationalisation for the finding of Berger and Pope (2011) who,
using basketball data and laboratory evidence, show that contestants in a
tournament who find themselves behind at half time are more likely to win
overall. Tournament models commonly predict the opposite.
Chapter 2 shows that when agents have reference-dependent preferences, the
reactions and decisions we expect of them change. However, even the way
that reference points are formed may differ between people. More generally,
there is a sizeable and persistent heterogeneity of preferences: Psychological
character traits like the Big 5 (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion,
Agreeableness and Neuroticism) and locus of control or economic preferences
like risk aversion, impatience, altruism or trust and reciprocity capture the
multitude of differences. Because these traits matter for individual decision-
making, a large literature in economics has come about investigating their
influence on outcomes like wages, health and subjective well-being. The
implicit consensus in this research is that some personality profiles achieve
better outcomes than others.
In Chapter 3 we start from this consensus and ask whether it is possible
for an educational policy to change these preferences in way that would be
associated with better outcomes.4 We set out to test whether a semester
abroad at university has a lasting impact on the personality of students
and collected new data with the help of the study abroad programme at
Maastricht University’s School of Business and Economics. Students at the
school need to go abroad in their third academic year, with roughly half of
them going in the first and another half going in the second semester. We find
that students return from their study abroad with greater Emotional Stability
(i.e., lower Neuroticism) and a more inward locus of control compared to the
3Chapter 2 is joint work with Agnes Vosen.
4Chapter 3 is joint work with Philipp Seegers.
3group that stays in Maastricht.
Both personality changes carry returns in the labour market in addition to
being associated with better health and higher subjective well-being in the
literature (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). Using German Socio-Economic Panel
data (Schupp & Wagner, 2002) on wages and personality we convert the
personality changes to a monetary equivalent of more than 25,000 Euros.
While we do not believe that this number is a precise representation of the
actual benefits, we argue that it underlines the potential economic benefits
of making non-cognitive skills a policy objective.
The concept that stable personality traits can change as a result of making
certain experiences is relatively new in the economics literature. In two ar-
ticles Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) and Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2013)
were the first to investigate this question for the Big 5 and for locus of con-
trol, respectively. Using panel data they found that personality traits do not
change much in response to big life events like unemployment or severe ill-
ness. In the psychological literature, however, personality change for adults,
though also being not universally accepted, has been documented both in
panel data (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006) and in interventionist
studies (Jackson, Hill, Payne, Roberts, & Stine-Morrow, 2012). The exis-
tence of selection based on personality, on the contrary, is widely accepted.
Several large meta-studies have concluded that personality traits are related
to job performance, but that returns to traits are often job-specific (Barrick
and Mount (1991); Salgado (1997); Barrick, Mount, and Judge (2001)).
Since most jobs require certain qualifications it is not clear at which stage
selection into them actually occurs. Studying a certain subject at university,
for example, has a considerable impact on the set of possible employments
graduates face. If the cost of switching professions is high enough, graduates
may decide to stay in their area of study for a long time. Consequently,
character traits that influence the choice of a university subject might be
an important determinant for the personality selection found in the industry
later on. In Chapter 4 we examine the selection into study tracks along such
personality traits.5 If the personality of graduates in a certain field differs
from the average, this can be due to a selection effect, to a change effect,
or due to a combination of the two. Students that enrol in a track may be
different ex ante (selection), but their personality could change in response
to engaging with that subject. We study both effects simultaneously.
Working on this project was particularly exiting as it involved the creation
of what is now, as of writing this thesis, the biggest student survey in Ger-
many: Fachkraft 2020. To collect the data we entered a cooperation with
the Cologne-based company STUDITEMPS which runs a large student job
platform in Germany and allowed us to send out questionnaires into their
5Chapter 4 is joint work Philipp Seegers.
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user base of currently more than 400,000 students. The project developed
into a study series for which we collect data once every semester. Over the
last three years we received more than 100,000 responses through this chan-
nel, with an average time spend on each survey of up to 55 minutes. To find
out more about personality and university subject choice we asked Fachkraft
2020 participants about their university or technical school and about the
subject they were enrolled in. We also included a comprehensive person-
ality test. For the 23,000 students in our sample we find a clear selection
into subjects based on personality. Out of the 110 subject-trait relationships
we investigate, 53 show significant differences to the overall student aver-
age. Studying a subject itself, however, does not have an effect on student
personality. If this finding is accurate, then it seems likely that much of
the personality-based job sorting is being decided at the moment of subject
choice.
The project presented in the last chapter chronologically came first.6 Where-
as Chapter 3 investigates effects of studying abroad on students, Chapter 5
deals with the effect of the internationalisation of higher education from the
perspective of a country at large. Two countries, large and small, are depicted
using a simplified education based growth model.7 The model is extended
to capture several potential effects of international education. If education
in the host country is subsidised, educating foreign nationals is a monetary
investment. Especially if student flows do not balance (like it can easily
happen between large and small countries) the question emerges whether
this money is well spent. One upside for the hosting countries is that there
is a chance that a foreign student decides to stay and join the host country’s
labour force bringing in more than 15 years worth of education. The model
also allows for different productivities of purely national and international
education: The personal development found in Chapter 3, for example, could
hint that international education is more productive than purely domestic
education.
Calibrating the parameters of the model to match the case for Germany
and the Netherlands we simulate economic output after a shock introduc-
tion of international education moved both economies out of their long run
steady state. The simulations yield parameter restrictions necessary to make
a country a net beneficiary of the internalisation of education. To make all
countries benefit in the long run, a greater return of international education
is an important factor. In Bergerhoff et al. (2013) we rationalised this by
referring to Oosterbeek and Webbink (2006) and saying:
“International education, indeed, catches a wage premium in
6Chapter 5 is joint work with Philipp Seegers, Lex Borghans and Tom van Veen.
7The idea for it was born as part of a Maastricht Research Based Learning project.
For the article Bergerhoff et al. (2013) that is the basis of Chapter 5 we could use some
insights of our earlier work with Tom van Veen.
5the labour market, but currently it is uncertain how much of it
is attributable to selection.”
Knowing the results of Chapter 3, we would now be more confident.
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Chapter 2
Can being behind get you
ahead?
Reference-dependent preferences and
Asymmetric Equilibria in an Unfair
Tournament.
2.1 Abstract
Everyone remembers a plot where a disadvantaged individual facing the
prospect of failure, spends more effort, turns around the game and wins
unexpectedly. Most tournament theories, however, predict the opposite pat-
tern and see the disadvantaged agent investing less effort. We show that
’turn arounds’, i.e. situations where the trailing player spends more effort
and becomes the likely winner of the tournament, can be the outcome of
a Nash equilibrium when the initial unevenness is known and players have
reference-dependent preferences. Under certain conditions, they are the only
pure strategy equilibrium. If the initial unevenness is large enough the advan-
taged player will always invest the most effort. We also show that equilibria
in which the player behind catches up without becoming the likely winner
do not exist.
2.2 Introduction
Rank order tournaments are a common mechanism for providing social and
economic order. They are somewhat special, because they tie the privilege
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of receiving a certain good or benefit to the effort of performing best at some
productive task. Politicians need to convince their constituents to be elected
and business men need to create value for their company to be considered for
promotion. Especially when high stakes are involved any indication of the
likely outcome of a tournament is an asset. Consider for example the large
betting industry that offers bets at dynamic quotes during the progress of
many publicly fought contests.
Many times tournaments are not entirely fair with one player, for example,
having more information or better relations with the tournament decider.
However, even more often such unevenness occurs in dynamic contests. Most
real world tournaments are dynamic in the sense that they require repeated
decisions by the competitors between which contestants can process new
information and recalibrate their tactics and effort investment. The most
general piece of new information is the intermediate score which exists in most
tournament settings. Politicians obtain interims feedback through opinion
polls and direct contact, students write mid-term or mock exams and sports
men can usually collect a time or score signalling their relative position in the
tournament. That such feedback is entirely even seems to be the exception
rather than the rule.1
Previous research like the work on dynamic tournaments by Chan, Courty,
and Hao (2009) or Aoyagi (2010) found that equilibria are “effort-symmetric”
with respect to feedback. This means that independent of the interims feed-
back, both competitors invest the same level of effort and only the sum of
efforts decreases the more uneven the feedback is. Without any difference in
effort provisions and the corresponding changes in the relative winning prob-
abilities these tournaments are essentially decided by the initial unevenness
and chance. Providing information about the intermediate state of the game
does not matter for the tournament outcome. The implicit assumption here
is that the interims feedback does not affect the agent’s utility directly. In
such a world, a victory against all odds that follows a drastic comeback after
having been far behind initially is the same as any other victory in terms of
utility.
Gill and Stone (2010) were the first to account for the direct effect of feed-
back on utility by introducing “fairness and desert” concerns in the form
of reference-dependent preferences. They investigate the influence of ex-
periencing something as deserved on equilibrium formation. Focussing on
effort-symmetric equilibria they could show that for uneven games, symmet-
ric effort equilibria, in which the interims score is immaterial to the outcome
1How humans react to feedback is not yet fully understood. One potentially related
idea is the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), which proposes that anyone
who holds contradictory beliefs will try to actively reduce this dissonance. Adjusting
one’s reference categories could be seen as one way to overcome the dissonance between
the desire for a certain prize and the naturally limited resources to obtain it.
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of the tournament, do not exist. However, currently it is not clear whether
asymmetric equilibria exist and if so whether they favour the victory of the
player ahead or behind.2
Gill and Stone (2010) derive predictions for asymmetric equilibria, but only
for the case where chance in the game is uniformly distributed. Uniformly
distributed errors are commonly used in economic models and laboratory
experiments. Indeed, without further knowledge of the situation at hand it
may be as well-suited as any other distribution. However, when thinking
about many examples of rank order tournaments the assumption that all
random events, no matter how extreme, are equally likely and that at the
same time more extreme events carry probability of zero appears odd. In
many tournament applications like job or sport contests the notion that
extreme events can happen, but do so with a low probability, has an intuitive
appeal.3
With uniformly distributed errors Gill and Stone (2010) find that just one
class of equilibria exists, in which the player ahead always spends more effort
than the trailing player. Our paper makes new and very different predictions
for the same setting when uncertainty is normally distributed. We find that,
depending on the strength of the reference-dependence, the tournament prize
and the initial unevenness three different classes of equilibria exist. Remark-
ably, in two of these classes the player being behind overtakes the opponent
and ends up with a higher probability of winning the tournament. In tour-
naments where the initial unevenness is strongly favourable for one party we
find a unique equilibrium, in which the leading player extends the lead by in-
vesting more effort than the player behind. However, when the game is tight
and the tournament prize is large enough to motivate the trailing player to
overcome the initial disadvantage, equilibria where the player behind spends
much more effort than the player ahead and obtains a higher probability of
winning the tournament, always exist.
In the first class of what we call Turn Around Equilibria (TAE) the agent
behind turns a marginal disadvantage ex ante, a 48 percent probability of
winning, into a marginal advantage with slightly more than a 53 percent
chance of winning. In the second class, the turn around can be much more
pronounced. Here a trailing player starting with a winning probability of say
around 30 percent may turn the game into one which yields almost certain
victory with the winning probability exceeding 90 percent. We show that
whenever the player behind catches up on the opponent the extra effort will
be sufficient to overcome, and even exceed the entire initial disadvantage. Sit-
uations where the trailing player makes up some of the disadvantage without
2In a new article Dato, Grunewald, and Mueller (2015) further explore the circum-
stances under which symmetric equilibria arise.
3Stern (1991) investigates score differences in football and cannot reject that they are
normally distributed.
10 2. Can being behind get you ahead?
becoming the favourite winner do not exist in equilibrium. We show that
depending on parameter values, the only possible pure strategy equilibrium
is one in which the disadvantaged player turns the game. Lastly, we predict
that equilibria where one agent catches up without taking the lead do not
exist.
The model is set up as a version of the tournament formulated by Lazear and
Rosen (1981) with the defining characteristic that the element of chance en-
ters additively into the contest success function. Since we introduce reference-
dependent preferences we use the notion of choice acclimating personal equi-
librium, that was introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), in which the
reference point is endogenous to maximisation process as a solution concept.
This means that agents take into account that their effort choice affects their
reference utility, i.e. that a high effort level makes winning more likely and,
hence, increases the reference point.
We contribute to a growing literature taking an interest in dynamic and
uneven tournaments. Contributions like Gill and Stone (2010) discuss that
in a dynamic setting agents have time to emotionally react to events and
deviate from standard rationality. How emotions within a sports game can
impact the motivation and ability of players psychologically is described by
Lazarus (2000). Klaassen and Magnus (2001) support this notion empirically
by showing, with a large data set of tennis matches, that points in tennis are
not individually and identically distributed. Gill and Prowse (2012) confirm
experimentally the key economic concept of strategy functions where the
effort of one agent crowds out the effort of the competitor. They introduce a
dynamic frame by letting subjects choose their effort sequentially providing
complete information about the choice of the first subject. Ederer (2010)
studies asymmetric equilibria as a result of asymmetrically distributed ability
between two agents. In his model interim feedback gives competitors the
chance to update their beliefs about their opponent’s ability. This leaves the
agent who is ahead in the game more confident of the value of his own effort
investment and results in relatively greater effort provision from the leading
player.
Our model provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of turn arounds.
Our results can explain the puzzling empirical evidence presented by Berger
and Pope (2011), who investigate data from 18, 060 American basketball
games and find that teams which are slightly behind at half time have a
significantly higher probability to win the game. As basketball is a complex
sport it could be argued, for example, that their results are not directly linked
to effort investment. However, they consolidate their finding by running an
experiment in a controlled laboratory environment where participants had
to compete in a real effort task that involved fast clicking and were told an
intermediate score at half time. Those who were slightly behind at half time
showed a marked increase in clicks in the second half compared to those who
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were ahead or to the no feedback control group. Previous literature was not
able to explain this pattern.4
2.3 The Model
The model studies a contest with two players j ∈ {A,B} who exert effort
ej. The initial unevenness is given by δ1 which represents an advantage for
Player A when positive and vice versa. The parameter δ1 is exogenous and
observable. The unobservable random noise parameter  is not affected by
effort and follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2.5 The
initial unevenness δ1, the shock term  and the two choice variables e
A and
eB constitute the final outcome which is determined by δ2 = δ1 + e
A− eB + .
The prize received by Player j is given by zj. If the player wins the tour-
nament the player receives the winner prize w, while the loser prize is nor-
malised to zero. Therefore: Player A wins if δ2 > 0 and receives zA = w,
while Player B obtains zB = 0 and vice versa. In this setting, the prob-
ability that Player A wins the contest equals Prob(δ2 > 0) which implies
Prob( > −δ1 + eB − eA). Using the fact that  is normally distributed
we can rewrite this as 1 − F (−δ1 + eB − eA) where F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of the normal distribution. From the symmetry of the
normal distribution it follows that:
Prob{A wins} = Prob(δ2 > 0) = 1− F (−δ1 + eB − eA) = F (δ1 + ∆e)
where ∆e = eA − eB
2.3.1 Utility with reference-dependent preferences
In the first part of our analysis we make no assumptions about how the refer-
ence points {rA, rB} are formed. Instead, we study the additional incentives
reference-dependence imposes on the players. Afterwards, we investigate how
a reference point contributes to determine the tournament winner assuming
that it is formed endogenously as described by Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006).
A player’s utility under a reference point rj is given by:
U j = v(zj) +m(zj|rj)− c(ej) where m(zj|rj) =
{
η(w − rj) if j wins
η(1 + θ)(0− rj) if j loses




(ej)2 , η ≥ 0 , θ ≥ 0
4In Ederer (2010) and Gill and Stone (2010), for example, the only type of asymmetric
equilibrium is one, where the leading player exerts more effort than the disadvantaged
opponent.
5To ensure pure-strategy equilibria the variance has to be sufficiently large as described
in (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).
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We assume rj ∈ [0, w] as the reference point for the tournament prize should
give us a value between the lowest possible outcome and the highest possible
outcome of the tournament. The utility is composed of a convenient con-
sumption part v, for which a linear specification is used, the cost of effort
provision c(ej) and a reference-dependent term. The weight of the reference
utility is calibrated by η, such that setting η = 0 returns the model without
reference-dependence. The parameter θ introduces loss aversion. It repre-
sents the difference between the disutility of falling short of the reference
point and the utility of exceeding it by one unit. We assume that losses loom
larger than gains and consequently take θ to be positive. We use quadratic
costs of effort for simplicity.
Both players choose an effort level to maximise their expected utility given
the unevenness δ1. Player A maximises expected utility with respect to e
A.
Consequently, the optimisation problem for Player A can be written as:
max
eA
F (δ1 + ∆e)(w + η(w − rA)) + (1− F (δ1 + ∆e))(−η(1 + θ)rA)− c(eA).
The first term F (δ1 + ∆e)(w + η(w − rA)) represents the utility in case
the agent wins the tournament. It is added to the utility of losing (1 −
F (δ1 + ∆e))(−η(1 + θ)rA) and the costs of effort which have to be paid
independent of the outcome. We define P j as winning-probability of player
j, i.e. PA = F (δ1 + ∆e) and P
B = 1 − F (δ1 + ∆e). The contribution of
reference-dependent utility lies in adding the term below to the standard
objective function wF (δ1 + ∆e)− c(eA):
Rj := η
(
P jw − rj[1 + θ(1− P j)])
Except for the potentially different reference points and the individual win-
ning probability the term Rj is the same for both players. While the sign
of Rj depends on the actual parameter values, it becomes apparent that
a greater reference point reduces the agents’ utility. This is intuitive as a
higher reference point renders a victory less sweat, but a defeat all the more











1 + θ(1− PA)]).
The expression reveals the delicate nature of the effect which may take differ-
ent sizes locally over the decision space. The first term ηf(δ1 +∆e)(w+ r
Aθ)
adds a positive incentive, that is caused by an increase of the effective prize
spread. Since Lazear and Rosen (1981) it has been known that when there
are no participation constraints an agent’s effort decision is not affected by
the absolute level of prizes, but by the spread between the winner and loser
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prize. reference-dependence increases the effective prize spread, making the
valuation of both tournament outcomes more extreme. The strength of its
impact, however, depends on the reference point rA which may take different
values for different {eA, eB, δ1}. The second term reduces to 0 in case of an




2.3.2 Endogenous Reference Points
In the following we endogenise the reference points and employ the choice-
acclimating personal equilibrium concept of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) to
derive the player’s first and second order conditions. After establishing a
necessary and sufficient condition for the interiority of all solutions in Lemma
1, we show in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that both first and second order
conditions can be reduced to one equivalent expression. We proceed to define
the three classes of equilibria and derive conditions for their existence in
Proposition 1 to Proposition 3. In Proposition 4 we give conditions for the
uniqueness of a Turn Around Equilibrium. Finally, in Proposition 5 we
discuss a fourth class of equilibria and interpret our results.
Modelling the reference point formation explicitly makes the precise effect
of reference-dependence tractable. We assume expectation based reference
points, but remain agnostic about whether expectations are formed as in
the reference-dependence theory of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) or as in disap-
pointment aversion theory developed by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sug-
den (1986). Additionally, we will allow the reference point to adjust in the
process. As solution concept we use choice-acclimating personal equilib-
ria (CPE) that are defined “as a decision that maximises expected utility
given that it determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lot-
tery” (p.1049, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)). In consequence, the reference
points are taken to be the endogenous winning probability of each player
multiplied by the winner prize, which constitutes the expected gain of each
player. Explicitly, the reference points are modelled as rA = F (∆e + δ1)w
for Player A and rB = (1 − F (∆e + δ1))w for Player B.6 The explicit refer-
ence point enables us to rewrite the contribution term RA for both players
to −wηθF (∆e + δ1)(1 − F (∆e + δ1)). The negative sign shows that each
player has an incentive to minimise this term. For player A this results in
the following incentive effect7:
6Like Gill and Stone (2010) we do not model a reference point in the effort domain.
We believe that further conceptual work on what a reference point in the effort domain
could be is interesting and could yield a valuable addition to this and other models. Yet
with all its psychological and technical implications it exceeds the scope of this paper.
7The corresponding term for Player B is ∂R
∂eB
= wηθf(δ1 + ∆e)(1− 2F (δ1 + ∆e)).
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∂RA
∂eA
= wηθf(δ1 + ∆e)(2F (δ1 + ∆e)− 1)
The derivative above is positive if δ1 + ∆e > 0 and negative if δ1 + ∆e < 0.
The absolute value of RA is highest for close games when δ1 + ∆e is zero and
falls steadily when the game gets less tight. In other words, players have an
incentive to flee the middle and avoid the uncertainty associated with close
games, which has also been described by Gill and Stone (2010). Note that the
incentive does not point the player into a particular direction. Whether the
player “gets ahead” or “falls behind” is not important. Evenness at the end
of the period is unattractive for agents with reference points since it jointly
maximises the size of the disutility from falling short of the reference point
weighted by the probability of its occurrence. With normally distributed
chance in the game, this opens up the possibility for multiple equilibria.
To understand this last point better consider Figure 2.1 which sketches
both player’s marginal costs and benefits.8 In the upper graph, which de-
picts the standard Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament without reference-
dependence, both player’s marginal benefit curves coincide with the equilib-
rium being reached at their peak. The effect of reference-dependence in the
lower graph of Figure 2.1 is to steepen and drive apart both player’s marginal
benefits. The peak of the marginal benefits of both players is now located in
the area where they themselves are more likely to win. Intuitively, both play-
ers benefit most from their effort when they can use it not only to increase
their own winning probability, but also to decrease the uncertainty of the
game. Here, without further asymmetries (i.e. δ1 6= 0) the same symmetric
equilibrium continues to exist.
This can also be seen in two top panels of Figure 2.2 which plots both players’
best response functions along with a 45 degree line for the given parameter
values η = 1, θ = 1, δ1 = 0.2, σ = 2 and w = 3pi. Moving from the top panel
to the middle one with reference-dependence the symmetric equilibrium is
preserved. However, we can now see that also two other potential asymmetric
equilibria on either side do exist. Again both players peak best response effort
lies on the side of the 45 degree line where they are more likely to win. When
we introduce asymmetry in favour of Player A (i.e. δ1 > 0) we can see that
A’s peak best response effort moves towards the 45 degree line while Player
B’s moves away from it. From the intersections of the two functions we can
thus identify three potential equilibrium candidates, two of whom lie above
the 45 degree line which implies that the disadvantaged player behind spends
more effort than the advantaged player.The best response functions have the
simple structure:
8The marginal benefits are given by MBA = MBB = w ∗ f(δ1 + ∆e)
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eB = wf(δ1 + ∆e)
[
1− ηθ(2F (δ1 + ∆e)− 1)] = wf(x)[1− γG(x)]
We define x = δ1 + ∆e, γ = ηθ and G(x) = 2F (x)− 1. The variable x, thus,
represents the state of the game just before the random shock  is realised.
Since the two conditions for eA and eB must be fulfilled in equilibrium they
provide information about when equilibria are interior, i.e. when both agents
provide strictly positive effort. From wf(x) > 0 we know that there is an
interior solution whenever (1 + γG(x)) and (1 − γG(x)) are both strictly
greater than zero. Small rearrangement implies that both conditions are ful-
filled whenever γ < | 1
G(x)
|. Since the set of possible values of |G(x)| which
is bounded above by one,9 a simple corollary is that for γ ≤ 1 the condition
is fulfilled and the corresponding equilibrium must be interior. This leads to
the first lemma.
9|G(x)| = |2F (x)−1| converges to 1, since the cdf of the normal distribution converges
to 0 for x→ −∞ and to 1 for x→∞.
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Figure 2.1: The Figure shows the Marginal Costs and Benefits of both
players. Player B’s effort increases from left to right. In the top panel without
reference-dependence (γ = 0) marginal benefits of both players are identical.
Introducing reference-dependence changes that. The Marginal Benefit curves
are now only equal at the equilibrium effort levels, which without initial
asymmetry are still symmetic (they are equal to two in this case).
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Figure 2.2: Effort combinations which fulfil each players First Order Con-
dition. All intersections are potential equilibrium candidates. Below the
45 line Player A exerts greater effort, above it Player B exerts more. The
top panel assumes w = 3pi and σ = 2. In the middle panel the reference-
dependence parameter γ = 1. In the lower panel Player A is additionally
given an advantage of δ1 = 0.2.
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Lemma 1. An equilibrium is interior if γ < | 1
G(x)
|. Therefore all equilibria
are interior whenever γ ≤ 1.
All lemmas and propositions are proven formally in Appendix 1. The term
1
G(x)
is always defined as G(x) 6= 0 for all x that describe equilibria. To
ensure that all equilibria are interior, we will assume γ < | 1
G(x)
|. This is not
a restrictive assumption as for any x, |G(x)| is always between zero at the
origin and one as x becomes arbitrarily small or large. Hence, all moderate
forms of loss aversion where γ ≤ 1 are covered as well as many stronger
versions depending on the degree of the state of the game x.
For simplification we proceed by combining both first order conditions as
well as both second order conditions to obtain two new functions we term
candidate and maximum condition function.
Lemma 2. The system of first order conditions can be expressed as the candi-
date function δ1 = x− 2wγf(x)G(x). All combinations of {eA, eB, δ1} which
fulfil this equation are referred to as candidate points.







then at the corresponding vector {eA, eB, δ1} both second order conditions
are fulfilled.







G(x)), the maximum condition function.
We can plot the candidate function and the maximum condition functions
into one system as illustrated in Figure 2.3. Both graphs depend on x which
is given on the horizontal axis. The candidate function is depicted by the blue
curve and every point on it represents an equilibrium in case the second order
conditions are fulfilled for the same x-value. The second order conditions are
jointly represented by the maximum condition function in red. In case this
function has a positive value for a certain x both second order conditions are
fulfilled. Remember that x was initially defined as eA − eB + δ1. For this
reason we know that Player A has a higher winning probability for positive
and Player B for negative x, but we also know that Player B must have
chosen a significantly higher effort than A in case of a negative x-value and
δ1 > 0. We can now read Figure 2.3 in a convenient way. The vertical axis
is also a scale for δ1; hence we can choose a particular initial unevenness δ1,
take the corresponding x-value from the candidate function and evaluate it
using the maximum condition function. When it is positive at that point, the
combination of x, δ1 must be an equilibrium. Lemma 2 shows that with the
help of the first order conditions the unique pair of {eA, eB} can be retrieved.
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Figure 2.3: maximum condition and candidate function with positive in-
tersections
2.4 Multiple Equilibria
In the following, we leave most technical details to the appendix but provide
some intuition verbally and graphically for why asymmetric equilibria exist.
We will assume throughout that δ1 > 0, i.e. Player A is ahead and benefits
from the initial unevenness.10
2.4.1 Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria
As explained earlier, introducing reference-dependence renders the middle
ground, i.e. when δ1 + ∆e is close to zero, unattractive to both players.
Without reference-dependence Player B and Player A would always choose
the same level of effort since both players have the same marginal costs and
benefits are also the same due to the symmetry of the normal distribution’s
density. Therefore, the player ahead always maintains the same advantage in
the relative winning probability. An extra incentive rewarding more unequal
winning probabilities like reference-dependent preferences, in this setting,
would just widen the already existing probability spread. To achieve this the
player ahead needs to put in relatively more effort than the player behind.
Thus, when reference-dependence increases the effective prize spread, both
players will invest more effort, but the player ahead claims a larger share
of the extra contribution. In the following this is referred to as Confirming
10Due to the symmetry of the problem all results also apply in case Player B is ahead.
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Asymmetric Equilibrium.
Definition 1. Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium (CAE)
A Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the advan-
taged player spends more effort than the other player.
Figure 2.4 shows CAEs explicitly when Player A being initially advantaged.
When δ1 is positive, Player A ends up with a higher winning probability and
the CAEs are located in the upper right quadrant of the coordinate system.
We see that each {x, δ1} combination, for which the candidate function lies in
this quadrant, is a CAE in case the maximum condition function is positive
for this x-value as well. In the depicted case there exists a CAE for all
values of δ1. However, this does not need to be the case.
11 While there will
always be candidate CAEs for all values of δ1, the maximum condition is not
necessarily fulfilled. We prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For δ1 large enough there always exists one Confirming
Asymmetric Equilibrium (CAE) that is a unique equilibrium.
For tournaments without reference-dependence, Lazear and Rosen (1981)
show that symmetric equilibria do not necessarily exist and depend on the
wage-schedule as well as the degree of uncertainty inherent to the tourna-
ment.12 Proposition 1 shows that strong unevenness at the start of the
tournament curbs the first point. For sufficient uncertainty, it eventually
guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. While equilibria in
which a leading player extends the lead are not uncommon in the literature,
we now introduce two further types of equilibria.
2.4.2 Type One Turn Around Equilibria
reference-dependence as described above introduces an incentive to “flee the
middle”, but this can be done in yet another way. As an alternative to the
CAE the player behind may decide to outspend the leading player. Such an
equilibrium is called Turn Around Equilibrium.
11It can happen, that the candidate function produces combinations of x and δ1 at which
the maximum condition function is still negative. In consequence CAEs are guaranteed
for great x and δ1, but given parameter values they may not exist for the whole range of
δ1.
12Imagine there was no uncertainty in the tournament. Then, each player would try
to marginally overbid the opponent and no equilibrium in pure strategies would exist.
Besides there would of course exist a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
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Definition 2. Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE)
A Turn Around Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the initially disadvan-
taged player spends so much more effort that this player has higher probability
to win the game than the opposing player.
Definition 3. Type one Turn Around Equilibria (TAE1)
Type one Turn Around Equilibria (TAE1) are TAEs that exist over an in-
terval for {eA − eB + δ1} that is open and bounded above by 0.
Suppose that Player B is initially disadvantaged and considers investing more
effort than Player A. For Player A this could be an equilibrium since the
player is willing to settle at a point where the marginal benefits together with
the marginal reduction of the reference-dependence cost meets the marginal
costs. The key to understanding this intuition is to see that the incentive
effect of reference-dependence changes sign at x = δ1 + ∆e = 0. When
Player A backs off, the incentive effect ∂R
A
∂x
= wγf(x)(2F (x) − 1) flips and
the player will accept an equilibrium where the lower marginal benefit minus
the reference cost of increasing effort equals the marginal cost. This intuition
is intact as long as the unevenness is rather small and the wage level is high
enough to motivate Player B to overcome the initial disadvantage, but not
so high as to make it intolerable for Player A to back off.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
i) If w > 1
4γf(0)2
and w < 1
2γf(0)2
, a type one Turn Around Equilibrium
(TAE1) always exists.
ii) TAE1s are always interior.
The condition provided formulates a parameter range for the exogenous tour-
nament prize w and the reference-dependence variables γ = ηθ. Under the
conditions of Proposition 2 no symmetric equilibria exist.13
In case of an initial disadvantage for Player B, TAEs are defined as equi-
librium points where Player B spends sufficiently more effort than Player A
to become the favourite for winning the tournament. In consequence, TAEs
for positive δ1 can be found in the upper left quadrant of Figure 2.4. When
δ1 > 0, as we assume throughout without loss of generality, TAE1s are equi-
libria located in the negative x-domain bordering zero. Depending on the
parameter values of w and γ these equilibria exist since the curvature of the
candidate function is strong enough to reach into the positive range of δ1
13This is also shown in Gill and Stone (2010).
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while the maximum condition function is still fulfilled for those x-values as
can be seen in Figure 2.4.14
The TAE1s that follow from Proposition 2 occur only for tight games and the
magnitude of the turn around is generally small. For illustration consider the
example where the tournament prize w = 5.5, chance has standard deviation
of σ = 1.5, the experience of losses is twice as strong as that of gains (θ = 1),
and reference utility is weighted equally strongly as consumption utility η = 1
such that γ = 1. Then, in a game where Player A is ahead by 0.033 standard
deviations initially, Player B can overtake in equilibrium turning around a
disadvantage of 0.06 standard deviations into a lead of roughly 0.06 standard
deviations. In terms of winning probabilities Player B starts the tournament
with a chance of winning of about 48.6 percent and ends it with about 52.4
percent. So the leading player has a 3.8 percentage points lower probability to
win the game in the end. This is similar to the empirical evidence of Berger
and Pope (2011) who conduct an experiment where participants compete
against each other over two periods in a real effort task. They find that
their subjects inserted most effort in the second period when being told that
they were slightly behind their opponent and were more likely to win as a
result. Berger and Pope (2011) also find a significant increase of winning
probability for basketball teams that are slightly behind before the break
compared to the leading team. Instead of having a lower probability to win,
the team being behind by one point is more likely to win the game. In case of
the NBA data the trailing team has 1.1 percentage points higher probability
to win the game than the leading team. For the NCAA the result is even
stronger: 5.6 percentage points. The difference in winning probability at the
breakpoint is significant. Naturally, this field data result can have various
explanations, one of which would be to describe it as a TAE1 under the
premises of this model.
2.4.3 Type Two Turn Around Equilibria
While the TAE1s described above are tight in the sense that the initially dis-
advantaged player increases his winning probability only marginally above
fifty percent, there can also be TAEs where the lagging player outspends the
opponent sufficiently to increase the winning probability to much more than
fifty percent.
14To verify that TAE1s are not only pathological cases, but appear over a range of
x, we estimate an interval of x values over wich TAE1s exist. For this we use a linear
approximation of the maximum condition function. Because of the convexity of the max-







. The maximum condition function is convex for the whole range
of w used in this proposition. The proof is given in Lemma 5. The boundaries for the set
are derived in the proof of Proposition 2.
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Definition 4. Type two Turn Around Equilibria (TAE2)
Type two Turn Around Equilibria (TAE2) are TAEs that exist over intervals
for {eA − eB + δ1} that are bounded above by some xδ ≤ 0.
In this second class of TAEs the leading player backs off much to benefit from
the following reference point reduction. This equilibrium may also exist for
greater values of w, which becomes apparent once we remember that the
weight of the reference-dependence effect, ∂R
A
∂eA
= ηf(δ1 + ∆e)w(θ(2F (δ1 +
∆e)−1)), increases in w. The stronger impact of reference-dependence makes
it more important in the turn around case for the leading player to reduce
the effort and flee the middle. As a result, even for high w, TAE2s exist.
To construct the formal criterion we will use the point where the candidate
function and the maximum condition function intersect. This point is given
by xs = (2f(x
s)2wγ−1−2f(xs)2G(xs)w2γ)σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2) . As x
s is exogenously determined by
the parameters of the model the conditions for w and γ provided in the
proposition are exogenous as well.
Proposition 3.

















≥ 0 , a type two Turn Around
Equilibrium (TAE2) in which the agent behind spends much more effort
than the agent ahead exists. The parameter xs determines the inter-
section between candidate function and maximum condition function
exogenously.
ii) If there exist TAE2s there also exist Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria
(CAEs) for small δ1.
iii) If the maximum condition function and the candidate function intersect
but there are no TAE2s also CAEs for small δ1 do not exist.
The conditions in Proposition 3 appear more complex than they are. Un-
like Proposition 2, Proposition 3 requires a minimum strength of reference-
dependence γ. If this condition is not met, it is never optimal for the leading
player to back off as much as required in the TAE2. To illustrate this con-
sider the following example: Suppose the tournament prize is w = 10, chance
again enters with a standard deviation of σ = 1.5, experience of losses is twice
as strong as that of gains (θ = 1) and reference utility enters fully with η = 1
such that γ = 1. Then, TAE2 exist for any unevenness that is smaller or
equal to 0.07 standard deviations. From an initial probability of winning
of around 47.3 percent the lagging player in this equilibrium improves his
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chances to 87.8 percent. This will only be optimal for the player ahead if it
is possible to benefit sufficiently from lowering the reference point and hence
γ must exceed a certain value. The new condition for w has a similar spirit.
While the lower bound coincides with the one in Proposition 2, the upper
bound is tightened by B ≥ 0 which added to the denominator. Again, the
reason is that for large tournament prizes it is never optimal for the leading
player to allow the other player to overtake. Imagine for example a student
who is competing with a class mate over relative grades in a course that is
not too important to both. After beating his mate in the midterms that
student could still decide not to prepare much for the final exam. He knows
that he will probably not come in first. Yet, that would not be too bad,
because he also knows that it happened because he was not really trying and
could not expect to do any better given his effort.
The definition of TAE2s includes all TAE1s, but TAE2s are potentially lo-
cated further away from zero than TAE1s as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Due
to the symmetry properties of the candidate and maximum condition func-
tion they can be seen as mirror images of certain CAEs. The maximum
condition function is axis-symmetric whereas the candidate function is point-
symmetric. Consequently, any intersection of the candidate function with the
x-axes on the negative domain also exists in the positive domain and vice
versa. For x-values larger than the positive root of the candidate function
there are CAEs while for x-values above the negative root there exist TAE2s
given that the maximum condition function to be positive. Due to axis-
symmetry of the maximum condition function it returns the same value at
both outer roots of the candidate function. Therefore, if the one equilibrium
exist for small δ1 the other does as well.
15
2.4.4 Unique Turn Around Equilibria
The equilibria described spark questions about why the leading player may
allow the other player to overtake. One conceivable explanation would be
that Turn Arounds are somewhat “lazy equilibria” where the agent ahead has
discovered that he greatly benefits from lowering its reference point. How-
ever, such an intuition does not truly capture the dynamics of the model.
When there are three equilibria, TAE1s are the equilibria with the highest
total effort investment. Only for the CAE and TAE2s large asymmetries
are possible because one player benefits from lowering his reference point.
Moreover, we show that for certain parameter values where the CAEs do not
exist a TAE1 is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 4. When 1
4f(0)2γ
< w < 1
2f(0)2γ
and γ ≤ − f(xs)2G(xs)pi22
σ2
+f(xs)2pi(−2+G(xs)2pi)
15Because of continuity this is at least the case for an -ball around the root of the
candidate function.
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Figure 2.4: maximum condition and candidate function with all equilibria
then for small unevenness the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is a type
one Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE1), where xs exogenously determines the
intersection between candidate function and maximum condition function.
The condition for w ensures that TAE1s exist, while the condition for γ rules
out the existence of TAE2s and even of CAEs for the particular interval of
unevenness over which TAE1s exist. This surprising result is made possible
by the missing guarantee for the existence of equilibria in Lazear and Rosen
(1981) type tournaments. In a region where the second order conditions do
not allow CAEs to exist, the TAE1 candidate point close to, but smaller than
zero, satisfies them as illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that a TAE1 can be the only equilibrium in pure
strategies. While we do not engage in equilibrium selection, this shows that
at least among pure strategies there are situations where TAE1s must be
played, as no other equilibria exist. Thus, we show that it does not need
differences in ability or imperfect information to obtain the unambiguous
prediction that a trailing player wins a tournament. Having expectation
based reference-dependent preferences can be sufficient for given parameter
constellations.
2.4.5 Catching Up Equilibria
At first glance the notion of Turn Around Equilibria maybe appears (too)
strict. It would have been possible to define TAEs as all asymmetric equilib-
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Figure 2.5: maximum condition and candidate function with only TAE1
ria in which the initially disadvantaged player spends more effort than the
advantaged player irrespective of whether the difference is significant enough
to turn the game. We call this broader class of equilibria Catching Up Equi-
libria (CUE).
Definition 5. Catching Up Equilibrium (CUE)
A Catching Up Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the initially disadvan-
taged player spends more effort than the opposing player.
From the definition it is apparent that every TAE must also be a CUE. How-
ever, we show that the converse holds as well. Every equilibrium in which
the player being behind invests more effort than the opponent is also a TAE.
In other words, situations where trailing player catches up a little without
turning the game do not exist.
Proposition 5. Every Catching Up Equilibrium is also a Turn Around Equi-
librium.
For an intuition consider again the equilibrium in the model without reference-
dependence. Although one player is advantaged at the start of the tourna-
ment both players pick the same effort. Compared to the trailing player in
this set-up, a player who tries to catch up, but not overtake, in the model with
reference-dependent preferences faces greater marginal effort costs, larger
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marginal benefits16 and a more negative marginal utility from reference com-
parison as the game becomes more even. If the agent had favoured the greater
marginal benefits over the marginal effort cost, it would have chosen to insert
more effort ex ante. Introducing an additional marginal cost in the form of
reference-dependence cannot motivate the agent to try catching up. Only
when the sign of the marginal effect of reference-dependence changes, as it
is the case once one agent overtakes the other, this can be an equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
Which factors motivate players to invest in contest success is still a vibrant
topic of debate. While classical tournament theory as introduced by Lazear
and Rosen (1981) focuses on the higher probability of winning as benefit
and the unpleasantness of effort as a cost, a large recent literature indicates
that players evaluate outcomes also along certain reference points. Such
reference-dependent preferences are an economically powerful concept, as
they can imply that an otherwise positive event causes negative utility if
the reference category was even more positive and vice versa. As a result,
theoretical predictions can change drastically once a model is augmented by
reference-dependence. In the context of tournaments, predicting a different
winner could be considered such a change.
We add to the work of Gill and Stone (2010), who focus on symmetric equilib-
ria when the half time score is even. For the large class of non even scores Gill
and Stone (2010) show that symmetric equilibria do not exist. We find that
depending on the strength of the reference-dependence, the tournament prize
and the initial unevenness three different classes of equilibria exist. In games
where the initial unevenness is strongly favourable for one party we find a
unique equilibrium, in which the leading player invests more effort than the
player behind. However, when the game is tight and the tournament prize is
large enough to motivate the lagging player to overcome the initial disadvan-
tage, Turn Around Equilibria, where the player initially behind spends much
more effort than the player ahead and has a higher probability of winning
the tournament, always exist.
Our results can help to explain tournament outcomes that so far have been
economically puzzling as presented by Berger and Pope (2011). Our results
generate further testable predictions. We find that for all equilibria where
the player behind spends more effort than the opponent, this player also has
a greater chance of winning the tournament. Thus, we show that equilibria,
in which the player behind merely catches up with the leading player do not
exist. Furthermore, we can show that under certain conditions the TAE is
16Since the probability density function of the normal distribution is single peaked at
x = 0.
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the unique pure strategy equilibrium. While dynamic implications of this
framework were only touched upon, future research adding a further optimi-
sation period may provide interesting insights into how the anticipation of
possible TAEs affects agents’ incentives in an initial period.
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2.6 Appendix 1
In this appendix we prove all propositions and the lemmas stated in the
main section. The proofs will make use of additional lemmas which are
proven within the proposition where they are used first. Throughout we will
assume without loss of generality that δ1 > 0, which implies that Player A is
at an advantage. However, due to the symmetry of both players all results
are also valid when δ1 < 0. All equilibria described assume that a solution
to the tournament exists. As described by Lazear and Rosen (1981) this is
always the case when precision of the random term given by 1
σ
is sufficiently
small.17 The following proofs hold for σ2 ≥ 1.
Lemma 1. An equilibrium is interior if γ < | 1
G(x)
|. Therefore all equilibria
are interior whenever γ ≤ 1.
Proof. This follows directly from the first order conditions. Using x = ∆e+δ
and γ = ηθ the first order conditions yield:
eA = wf(x)(1 + γG(x))
eB = wf(x)(1− γG(x))
Since wf(x) must be positive we will obtain interior solutions whenever (1 +
γG(x)) and (1 − γG(x)) are also greater than zero. This implies that both
conditions are fulfilled whenever γ < | 1
G(x)
|.
The term G(x) will never be 0 for any equilibrium with δ1 > 0:
Suppose: G(x) = 0⇒ 2F (x)− 1 = 0⇔ F (x) = 1
2
⇔ 0 = x = δ1 + ∆e. From
the first order conditions we know that in case of x = 0 eA = eB = wf(0)⇒
∆e = 0. This leads to a contradiction with δ1 > 0.
18
Since the function |G(x)| is bounded above by one and open there, a simple
corollary is that for γ ≤ 1 the condition is fulfilled and the corresponding
equilibrium must be interior.
Lemma 2. The system of first order conditions can be expressed as the candi-
date function δ1 = x− 2wγf(x)G(x). All combinations of {eA, eB, δ1} which
fulfil this equation are referred to as candidate points.
Proof. Using x = ∆e+ δ and γ = ηθ the first order conditions yield:
eA = wf(x)(1 + γ(2F (x)− 1))
eB = wf(x)(1− γ(2F (x)− 1))
17See Lazear and Rosen (1981) p.845 for more information.
18This also reveals that there cannot exist symmetric equilibria with initial unevenness.
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Subtracting both equations and substituting G(x) = 2F (x)− 1 leads to:
eA − eB = 2wf(x)γG(x) (2.1)
Since x− δ1 = eA − eB we can reformulate the above expression as:
δ1 = x− 2wf(x)γG(x)
The variable x describes an equilibrium uniquely whereas the exact corre-
sponding effort combination can be revealed by inserting x back into the first
order conditions.







then at the corresponding vector {eA, eB, δ1} both second order conditions
are fulfilled.
Proof. The second order conditions for a local maximum are given by:
wf ′(x)− wf ′(x)γ + 2γw [f ′(x)F (x) + f(x)2]− 1 < 0 (2.2)
wf ′(x)(−1)− wf ′(x)γ + 2γw [f ′(x)F (x) + f(x)2]− 1 < 0 (2.3)





By substituting (2.4) into (2.2) and (2.3) we can derive new inequalities
which include only the density and the distribution function of the normal















− 1 < 0
We will use the symmetry of the above two statements to condense their
informational content into a single condition. Using a = 2γwf(x)2, b =
w x
σ2
f(x) and c = γG(x) we can reformulate the statements to:
a− b(1 + c)− 1 < 0
a+ b(1− c)− 1 < 0
which can be rewritten as:
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−b < 1− a+ bc
b < 1− a+ bc
It is now clear that both conditions must be fulfilled whenever |b| < 1−a+bc







2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
Proposition 1.
For δ1 large enough there always exists one Confirming Asymmetric
Equilibrium (CAE) that is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. We first showed in Lemma 2 that we can rewrite the system of first
order conditions to a simpler, but equivalent representation. Afterwards,
using symmetry we derived a single bound from the second order conditions
which will be necessary and sufficient to identify equilibria in Lemma 3.
We make use of the candidate function from Lemma 2 and the maximum








δ1 = x− 2wγf(x)G(x)
We know that f(x)G(x)→ 0 for x→∞ since f(x)→ 0 and G(x)→ 1. For
this reason letting δ1 go towards ∞ implies that x→∞.









The second term on the RHS will converge to the constant γ as x→∞. The
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So the maximum condition will be fulfilled for sufficiently large δ1. It is not
only unique in the class of asymmetric equilibria but for all equilibria as
symmetric equilibria cannot exist for δ1 6= 0 (see Proposition 4 in Gill and
Stone (2010)).
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove Proposition 2 we first show that under certain conditions candidate
points in the sense of Lemma 2 exist that are potentially type one Turn
Around Equilibria. We proceed by showing that the maximum condition
function introduced in Lemma 3 is strictly convex over some interval.
Lemma 4. For w > 1
4f(0)2γ
, there always exist a positive δ1 such that its
corresponding extreme points include candidate Turn Around Equilibria (i.e.
x < 0).
Proof. We show that under the condition TAE candidates (i.e. points where
both player’s First Order Conditions are fulfilled s.t. x < 0) exist for small
positive values of δ1. The inverse of the candidate function Lemma 2 would
yield the equilibrium candidates for each value of δ1. Since it is not possible
to express the inverse explicitly we show that the function produces a small
positive δ1(x) when given a small negative value for x as an argument. Note
that for x < 0 the function G(x) < 0 as well.
δ1(x) = x− 2wγf(x)G(x) (2.5)
The derivative of this function with respect to x yields:
∂δ1(x)
∂x
= 1− 4wγf(x)2 + x
σ2
2wγf(x)G(x)
When x = 0 and w = 1
4f(0)2γ
the above expression equals zero and is negative
for any w larger than 1
4f(0)2γ
. Given this negative slope at x = 0 the function
must be positive for some small negative x.


















for x < 0









γ > 0 (2.6)
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(σ2 + x2) + (3 − 2x2
σ2
) > 0. Solving as an







We then find the maximum value for 2.7 using the following first order con-
dition,








65.19 Then, at the maxi-









i) If w > 1
4γf(0)2
and w < 1
2γf(0)2
, a type one Turn Around Equilibrium
(TAE1) always exists.
ii) TAE1s are always interior.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 4 that for certain values of w extreme point
couples (for values of {eA, eB, δ1}) exist that could be type one Turn Around
Equilibria (TAE1). Lemma 5 gives us the convexity of the maximum condi-
tion for certain values of w.
We will execute the proof of part i) by using Lemma 4 and by showing that
given w < 1
2γf(0)2
the maximum condition derived in Lemma 3 is fulfilled.
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Now suppose x = 0. We obtain:
2γf(0)− 2γf(0) + 0− 0 = 0 < 1
wf(0)
− 2γf(0)
Therefore we know that for all w < 1
2γf(0)2
the maximum condition func-
tion 1
wf(x)




will take up a value greater than zero
when x = 0. Then, it follows by the continuity of the maximum condi-








To obtain a conservative estimate of an interval in which the TAE1s lie, we
use the strict convexity of the maximum condition function shown in Lemma
5. Now we can derive the first order Taylor approximation around x = 0 for
















Given the positive slope and the convexity of the maximum condition func-
tion we know, that the intersection of the approximation with the abscissa
will provide a conservative lower bound for the interval. The resulting inter-





As G(x)→ 0 for x→ 0 all TAE1s close to zero are interior as stated in part
ii).
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove Proposition 3 we first show in Lemma 6 that there is only one
convex interval for x over which candidate TAEs exist. We continue by
showing in Lemma 7 that the candidate function and the maximum condition
function have an intersection where δ1 > 0 or the maximum condition is
always fulfilled. Then, we show in Lemma 8 that the maximum condition
function cannot intersect the horizontal axis more than twice. Lastly, we
establish in Lemma 9 that the maximum condition function may not have
these two roots over an interval over which it is strictly greater than the
candidate function.
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Definition 6. Intersection in positive/negative range
We say that two function intersect in positive/negative range, when they
return a positive/negative value at that intersection.
Lemma 6. For w > 1
4f(0)2γ
, the candidate function δ1(x) = x−2wγf(x)G(x)
has exactly one maximum on the domain x ∈ (−∞, 0). At this maximum the
candidate function is positive. There exists some x∗ < 0 such that δ1(x∗) = 0.
Proof. We know from Lemma 4 that when w > 1
4f(0)2γ
Turn Around candi-
dates with x < 0 and δ1(x) > 0 exist for some x close to zero. Moreover, it is
easy to see that δ1(x) → −∞ when x → −∞ and that δ1(0) = 0. Since the
candidate function is continuous there must be at least one maximum point
for negative x. In the following we will show that there is only one. Consider
















(G(x) + x(2f(x)− xG(x)
σ2
)) (2.10)
Note that |G(x)| < 0 for x < 0 so that (2.10) is strictly negative and hence
the first derivative is monotonously decreasing as long as G(x)x
σ2
≤ 2f(x).
This is fulfilled as long as 2f(x)σ
2
G(x)
≤ x and x < 0. Inserting the boundary
case x = 2f(x)σ
2
G(x)
in (2.9) simplifies it to:
1− 2wγ(−2f(x)2 + 2f(x)2) = 1 > 0
However when x = 0 equation (2.9) is smaller than zero if w > 1
4f(0)2γ
.
Thus the first derivative of the candidate function is below zero for x = 0
and greater than zero when x = 2f(x)σ
2
G(x)
and it is monotonously decreasing
over the interval [2f(x)σ
2
G(x)
, 0). Thus, the first derivative intersects the abscissa




(2.9) is always positive and therefore does not have another root for negative
x.

















and σ large enough
• either the maximum condition function and the candidate function in-
tersect and do so for x < 0 when δ1 > 0 only
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• or in case of no intersection the maximum condition is fulfilled for all
x where the candidate function has positive values.
Proof. To derive the conditions for when the intersection is within positive
range (as illustrated in Figure 2.3) we begin by setting both functions equal.
The intersection point is endogenously described by a value for x that is xs =
(2f(xs)2wγ−1−2f(xs)2G(xs)w2γ)σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2) and is used as an argument for the maximum
condition which, then, yields 0 < −2f(xs)2wγ(G(xs)w+G(xs)2wγ−σ2)+σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2) . Using
σ2 ≥ 1 we can derive the following condition. The latter expression is larger

















To ensure that the equilibrium is interior we assume γ < − 1
G(x)
. When
γ < − 1
G(x)
, (2.11) is always negative and is therefore neglected. Instead we
employ (2.12) as an upper bound. To ensure that the lower bound w > 1
4γf(0)2
is below (2.12) another restriction for γ is required which is obtained by









This can be rearranged as condition for γ:




+ f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi) (2.13)
This expression appears to be complicated and restrictive. However, it can
be simplified at little cost in terms of accuracy. Using that G(x) < 0 for
negative x and that f(x)2 < 1
2piσ2
, one can quickly see that the denominator
will always be larger than one. The numerator contains G(x) which equals







−t2dt. It must hold that the actual area
underneath the integrated function is smaller than the area of the rectangle
formed by the global maximum of the function over the x-interval. The
largest value e−t
2
may assume is one. Thus, it holds for negative x that
−G(x) = −Erf( x√
2σ
) ≤ − 2√
2piσ
x ∗ 1. For the entire numerator this implies






σ2 , the maximum of which is at x = − σ√
2
.
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Figure 2.6: maximum condition and candidate function having no inter-
section points in the negative domain






2 ≈ 0.53 and whenever γ ≥ 0.54,
condition (2.13) will also be satisfied. When both conditions are fulfilled
any intersection between the maximum condition and the candidate function
occurs in positive range.
Suppose no intersection between the candidate function and the maximum
condition function and hence no xs exists (as illustrated in Figure 2.6). For
sufficiently small x we know that the maximum condition function is always
positive while the candidate function is strictly negative. Without an inter-
section the continuity of both functions implies that the maximum condition
function lies above the candidate function for all x < 0. However, when
w > 1
4f(0)2γ
it is known from Lemma 4 that there are always values for x < 0
where the candidate function is positive. Since the maximum condition func-
tion must return greater values than the candidate function it also must be
positive.
Lemma 8. The maximum condition function has no more than two roots
when x < 0 and w < 1
2f(x)2γ
.
Proof. Setting the maximum condition function equal to zero and solving
for x yields xR = σ
2(2wγf(x)2−1)
wf(x)(1+γG(x))
= xR(x). This equation must be fullfilled for
every root of the maximum condition function. We show that the maximum
condition function has at most two roots by showing that this equation has
at most two solutions for x < 0. For this we demonstrate in the remainder
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of the proof that the function xR(x) = σ
2(2wγf(x)2−1)
wf(x)(1+γG(x))
is strictly concave and
can, thus, have at most one maximum. To understand why this implies the
statement in the lemma, consider the following: We want to know for how
many x the equation xR = xR(x) can be fulfilled. We also know that xR (the
left-hand-side of the equation) is a straight line with slope one. If we now
knew that xR(x) was strictly concave, we would know that it cannot intersect
the straight line xR more than twice (and hence that the maximum condition
function may not have more than two roots). Thus, in the remainder of the
proof we show that the second derivative of xR(x) ist strictly smaller than















We now show that the term above is strictly negative. For this it suffices
to look at the numerator of both fractions as the denominators are strictly
positive under the assumption of Lemma 1 that γ < | 1
G(x)
|. The numerator
of the first fraction is a sum of two elements. The first element must be
negative, since (2wγf(x)2 − 1) < 0 when w < 1
2f(x)2γ
. The second element
is all positive except for the x which is taken to be smaller than zero. Thus,
we know that the first fraction is negative. The second fraction, which gets
substracted, is positive. It is also composed of two elements, the first of which
is unambiguously positive while the second is positive as long as w < 1
2f(x)2γ
.
In consequence, the second derivative of xR(x) is strictly smaller than zero.
Therefore, the equation xR(x) = σ
2(2wγf(xR)2−1)
wf(xR)(1+γG(xR))
has at most two solutions
and the maximum condition function has at most two roots.
Lemma 9. The maximum condition function cannot have two roots within




Proof. Consider again the root of the maximum condition function as given
by xR(x) = σ
2(2wγf(xR)2−1)
wf(xR)(1+γG(xR))
. We will show that its first derivative is strictly
positive if the maximum condition function lies above the candidate function.
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−x(1 + γG(x))(2wf(x)γ + 1
f(x)
)− 4wσ2γ2f(x)2 + 2γσ2
w(1 + γG(x))2
(2.15)
As the denominator is positive it remains to show that the numerator is
strictly positive. We start by rewriting the term to the following inequality:
σ2(1− 2wγf(x)2)− x
2f(x)γ
(1 + γG(x))− wxf(x)(1 + γG(x)) > 0 (2.16)
The last two subtrahends of the numerator are negative for all x < 0 whereas
the first summand is positive in case w < 1
2γf(x)2
. Thus, if condition (2.14)
implies w < 1
2γf(x)2
, the lemma must be true. Consequently, we verify in the
following that w < 1
2γf(x)2
holds if the maximum condition function is bigger
than the candidate function.
We begin by considering the large term under the root in the denominator
of w˜ in condition (2.14):√
f(x)2(−8G(x)γσ4 + (x+G(x)xγ − (x+ 2f(x)γ)σ2)2) =√
f(x)2(4f(x)2γ2σ4 + x2((1 + γG(x))− σ2)2 + C)
Firstly, we show that the term C = −8G(x)γσ4−4f(x)γσ2x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)
is positive.
0 < −4(2G(x)γσ4 + f(x)γσ2x((1 +G(x)γ)− σ2))
⇔ 0 < −4γσ2(σ2(2G(x)− f(x)x) + f(x)x(1 + γG(x)))
⇔ 0 > σ2(2G(x)− f(x)x) + f(x)x(1 + γG(x))
It is easy to verify that (2G(x) − f(x)x) is strictly negative21 for all x < 0.
Since the term (1+γG(x)) is positive by the assumptions on γ, the statement
21Its derivative f(x)(3 + x
2
σ2 ) is strictly positive. Moreover it is zero when x = 0 and
approaches −2 when x→ −∞.
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above must be true and C is indeed positive. Having established that C is




















Hence, w˜ < 1
2γf(x)2
is true as well. Consequently, (2.16) holds for all x < 0
where the maximum condition function lies above the candidate function.
Proposition 3.

















≥ 0 , a type two Turn Around
Equilibrium (TAE2) in which the agent behind spends much more effort
than the agent ahead exists. The parameter xs determines the inter-
section between candidate function and maximum condition function
exogenously.
ii) If there exist TAE2s there also exist Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria
(CAEs) for small δ1.
iii) If the maximum condition function and the candidate function inter-
sect, but there are no TAE2s, also no CAEs for small δ1 exist.
Proof. i) To establish the existence of TAE2s, i.e. TAEs over an x-interval
which is not necessarily adjacent to zero, one needs to show that over such an
interval and under some conditions both the candidate function and maxi-
mum condition function return positive values. In Lemma 6 it was established
that the candidate function has exactly one maximum and no other extreme
points over the domain of strictly negative x. We also know from Lemma
4 that when w > 1
4γf(0)2
the candidate function always returns positive val-
ues over the interval given by the roots of candidate function (x∗, 0) where
x∗ = 2wγf(x∗)G(x∗). Lemma 7 implies that when candidate and maximum
condition function do not intersect for x < 0 the maximum condition derived
in Lemma 3 is fulfilled for all x where the candidate function is positive.
Especially at the left root of the candidate function this leads to TAE2s that
are rather ’far away’ from x = 0. Additionally, given its conditions Lemma
7 implies that if intersections between the candidate and the maximum con-
dition function exist for some x < 0, then both the maximum condition and
the candidate function are positive at the intersection as illustrated in figure
2.4. It follows that around this intersection TAE2s exist.
2.6. Appendix 1 41
Before we continue with part ii) we show that Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 also
hold for the upper bound of w given in Proposition 3. We will proceed with
the proof for the general case using x so it will also hold for a specific xs. We




which holds if B is strictly positive.
If this holds the upper bound used in Proposition 3 is always smaller than
the one used in Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 meaning they also hold for this
proposition. First we show that the upper bound for w given in Proposition
3 is tighter than the upper bound of Lemma 7. The latter’s denominator can
be reformulated as follows:
γf(x)2 +
√











≤ 2γf(x)2 +√−A = 2γf(x)2 +B
This last step was established by using Jensen’s inequality. Since the numer-
ators of both upper bounds are equal this step shows that the upper bound
given in Proposition 3 is tighter than that of Lemma 7. Solving for B leads
to:
B ≥ −γf(x)2 +
√
γ2f(x)4 − A > 0
This holds as A is negative for γ ≤ | 1
G(x)
|.




. This also holds for the case
x = xs.
ii) To study the relationship between strong TAEs and CAEs for small δ1 we
make use of the symmetry property of the candidate function δ1(x) as well
as the maximum condition function maxcond(x):
δ1(x) = −δ1(−x)
maxcond(x) = maxcond(−x)
Having CAEs means that δ1(x) > 0 for x > 0 and the maxcond(x) > 0.
Using the symmetry this is equivalent to δ1(−x) < 0 whilemaxcond(−x) < 0.
From Lemma 6 we know that the candidate function has only one maximum
on the negative domain and in Proposition 1 we derived that the candidate
function approaches infinity if x → ∞. By symmetry this implies that the
candidate function goes towards minus infinity if x→ −∞. Since δ1(0) = 0
it follows from continuity that candidate CAEs (not necessarily CAEs) exist
for all values of δ1.
To find CAEs we have to insure that the maximum condition is fulfilled. We
use the previously derived lemmas to make a statement about the maximum
condition for all x < xδ, where xδ is the negative root of the candidate
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function, and, then, use the symmetry properties from above to apply it
to the candidate CAEs. We know that the maximum condition as derived
in Lemma 3 goes to infinity when x → −∞ and since we have shown the
existence of TAE2s in part i) there also exist some x < 0 where maximum
condition and candidate function are both positive.
In consequence for the maximum condition to become negative over x < 0 it
has to have at least two roots on the same domain. Moreover, we know from
Lemma 8 that the maximum condition function cannot not have more than
2 roots for x < 0.
One possibility would be that the maximum condition function could have
one root below xδ and one above. In this case there would be a negative
intersection of the maximum condition function with the candidate function
as the candidate function must be negative for x < 2wγf(x)G(x) by Lemma
4. Since our conditions for TAE2s ensure that all intersection points are
positive for x < 0 this case can be excluded. Secondly, the roots of the
maximum condition function could both be below xδ. This, however, directly
contradicts Lemma 9 as the maximum condition has to be bigger than the
candidate function at xδ. Otherwise this would be equivalent to the previous
example. Using symmetry this implies the existence of CAEs for small δ1.
Lastly we address part iii). Following the same argument we know that
in cases where no TAE2s exist, but the candidate and maximum condition
functions still intersect, the intersection point must lie in negative range.
Since the candidate function is negative for sufficiently small x, we know
from Lemma 6 that the candidate function will not have an intersection with
the abscissa for x < 0. This implies, that, because of the symmetry property
of the candidate function, CAEs for small δ1 do also not exist.
2.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. When 1
4f(0)2γ
< w < 1
2f(0)2γ
and γ ≤ − f(xs)2G(xs)pi22
σ2
+f(xs)2pi(−2+G(xs)2pi)
then for small unevenness the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is a type
one Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE1), where xs exogenously determines the
intersection between candidate function and maximum condition function.
Proof. We know from Proposition 3 and Lemma 7 that TAE2s only exist
when:




+ f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi) (2.17)
Moreover, we know from Proposition 3 that for δ1 small enough CAEs only
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exist if TAE2s exist as well. TAE1s as described in Proposition 2 on the






Since the lower bound for γ (2.17) is strictly positive and lower and upper
bound for w cannot intersect, we know that when the condition for γ is not
satisfied there is yet a prize level w for which a TAE1 exists and is the only
equilibrium for small enough δ1.
2.6.5 Proof of Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Every Catching Up Equilibrium (CUE) is also a Turn Around
Equilibrium (TAE).
Proof. Remember that x was defined as x = ∆e+δ1. Suppose again without
loss of generality that player 1 is initially ahead, i.e. δ1 > 0, and that at
the CUE player 2 spends more effort than player 1 with ∆e < 0, but not
enough to turn the game, i.e. ∆e + δ1 > 0. From Lemma 2 we know that
the candidate function provides all possible equilibrium candidate points:
δ1(x) = x− 2f(x)wγG(x)
To find a CUE that is no TAE we need to show that there exist candidate
points where for x > 0 and ∆e = x − δ1 < 0. We show that this can never
be the case:
x− δ1 = 2f(x)wγG(x)
For x > 0 the RHS cannot be negative since G(x) is positive for all x > 0
and the other terms are always positive. So x − δ1 will be positive for all
x > 0.
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Appendix 2
2.7 Technicalities
We provide these pages as an additional aid for the verification of some
expressions.
2.7.1 Derivation of (2.11) and (2.12) in Lemma 7
We want to find a condition for w that ensures that the intesection between
the candidate and the maximum condition function occurs in positive range.
We show in Lemma 7 that this must be the case when:
0 <
−2f(xs)2wγ(G(xs)w +G(xs)2wγw − σ2) + σ2
f(xs)w(1 +G(xs)γ − σ2)
Note that as G(xs)γ < 0 and σ2 ≥ 1 the denominator is smaller zero. Col-
lecting the w terms and multiplying with the negative denominator yields:
0 > w2(−2f(xs)2γG(xs)(1 +G(xs)γ)) + 2f(xs)2wγσ2 − σ2


























The first possible solution is equivalent to (2.11), the second to (2.12) in
Lemma 7.
2.7.2 Derivation of (2.13) in Lemma 7
























































− f(xs)2)2 − f(xs)4 + 2G(x
s)f(xs)2
σ2γ























+ f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi) < γ



























− 1)− γ(2f(x)− x
σ2
G(x))) + 1 > 0
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Collecting all x together and multiplying by σ2 we obtain:
w22γf(x)2G(x)σ2 + wf(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2) + σ2 > 0
To solve for w we now use the quadratic formula for the equality w =
−b±√b2−4ac
2a
where a = 2γf(x)2G(x)σ2, b = f(x)(x((1 + γG(x)) − σ2) −
2γf(x)σ2) and c = σ2. Plugging in a, b and c yields:
w =
f(x)(x(σ2 − (1 + γG(x))) + 2γf(x)σ2)
4γσ2f(x)2G(x)
±√(f(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2))2 − 8γσ4f(x)2G(x)
4γσ2f(x)2G(x)





We neglect the postive root, as we are looking for a conservative upper
bound. The crucial step to obain (2.14) is to realise that the denomina-
tor 4γσ2f(x)2G(x) can be rewritten as s
2−t
2σ2
, which we now show:
s2 − t =(f(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2))2


























The Impact of International Education on
Non-Cognitive Ability.
3.1 Abstract
Adapting to new challenges and environments can change the knowledge and
skill set of an individual, but it may also have an impact on personal prefer-
ences and interests. While such traits seem to be important determinants of
labour market outcomes, health and subjective well-being, they are regarded
as relatively stable. In this study we test whether Big 5 and Locus of Con-
trol personality traits can be changed through an international experience
at university. We find that university students who go abroad return with
lower Neuroticism and a more inward Locus of Control. Other studies and
our own estimates from the German Socio Economic Panel suggest that these
changes carry a premium in the labour market.
“Personality change has been conceptualized as a bottom-up
process in which individuals gradually come to see themselves in
a different light in part as a consequence of taking on new roles
that require novel behaviours.”
p.2, Jackson, Hill, et al. (2012) on Roberts, Wood, and Caspi
(2008)
“It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door,” he
used to say. “You step into the Road, and if you don’t keep your
feet, there is no telling where you might be swept off to.”
-Frodo about Bilbo Baggins.
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3.2 Introduction
Personality, like cognitive ability, has been suggested to determine a wide
range of life outcomes. Several studies have linked it to educational attain-
ment, occupational choice, job performance and health. An implicit con-
sensus from this research is that certain personality profiles generate better
outcomes than others. If personality was somehow transformable, for exam-
ple through experience, the question would emerge whether it is possible to
invest in it directly.
The aim of this paper is to test whether personality can be affected by an
educational policy. To this end we evaluate an international education pro-
gramme that offers students an international experience during their time
at university, an area that can be easily targeted by policies. We ask par-
ticipants of the student exchange programme at Maastricht University to
fill in personality questionnaires at three points in time, where a small tim-
ing asymmetry is used to create a treatment and a control group. We find
that students who go abroad experience changes in two personality domains,
which, among others, are associated with greater productivity in the labour
market. Our evidence suggests that the changes could be persistent.
To study the average treatment effect of international education on any given
person, one would require randomly selected subjects, that are randomly
divided into a going-abroad treatment and staying-home control group. In
the context of international education such data is not easy to come by,
especially since some portion of the population does not want to go abroad.
If we wanted to evaluate policies that would force people into international
education, this would be problematic. Moreover, all programmes known to
us are rather opt-in by nature including study programmes with mandatory
study abroad that have a form of voluntary ’early’ selection by students. We,
hence, focus on the treatment effect on the treated, knowing that the effect
on somebody who did not select into such a programme might be different.
For our study we make use of a the timing asymmetry resulting from the fact
that it is more economical for a university if not too many students go abroad
at the same time. At Maastricht University’s School of Business and Eco-
nomics (SBE), where all Bachelor students take a mandatory semester abroad
in their third year, this means that some students go in the first semester
of their third year, while others go in the second semester, but all of them
go eventually. Students were asked to fill in questionnaires at the beginning,
the middle, and the end of the academic year. The design is summarised in
Figure 3.1 and provides us with variation across and within subjects. We fol-
low a differences-in-differences identification strategy comparing the changes
from those who went abroad to those who stayed in Maastricht. This distin-
guishes us from earlier psychological work by Zimmermann and Neyer (2013),
who carefully analyse possible channels of personality change in response to
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Figure 3.1: A three survey design: a= Change after being abroad in autumn
(group A), b= Change after staying the spring in Maastricht (group A), c=
Change after staying the autumn In Maastricht (group B), d=Change after
being abroad in spring (group B).
a study abroad, but only control by using students who decided not to go
abroad. The data allows to study both the initial effect of studying abroad
and its persistence after an equally long period in Maastricht.
We find that going abroad has a significant and lasting impact on Locus of
Control, which measures to what extend a person feels in control of life events,
and on Neuroticism. On the 23 point Locus of Control scale students become
more than 2 points (or 0.38 standard deviations) more inward after having
gone abroad compared to the control group of students staying in Maastricht.
An internal Locus of Control is associated with the believe that own decisions
and effort have a decisive impact on individual life events, and according to
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) is linked to improved labour-market
outcomes. The result is robust irrespective of whether the groups going
in the two semesters are pooled and significant across specifications. For
the smaller sample, where it was possible to observe long term effects the
hypothesis that mean reversion does not exist could not be rejected at a
significance level of more than eighty percent. For the Big 5 personality
traits, the results are mixed. We find significant decreases of Neuroticism,
the trait capturing low self esteem and tendencies for experiencing anxiety
and depression. For the remaining traits, no stable patterns are detected.
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Overall, our results suggest that studying abroad has an impact on a stu-
dent’s personality. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that uses correlations
between wages and personality traits from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP, Schupp and Wagner (2002)) suggests that the productivity in-
crease from the mean-level personality changes we measured could be around
2.4%. Under some assumptions this would equivalent to a net present value
in monetary terms of 21, 525 EUR (24, 022$ at current exchange rate of
1.116$/EUR).1 Naturally, such a result should applied with caution since,
for example, it is not proven that the effect will persist over a longer time
horizon.
A more inward Locus of Control and lower Neuroticism are also said to be
related positively to health and subjective well-being. In their meta-study
DeNeve and Cooper (1998) find that Locus of Control and emotional stability
(the inverse of Neuroticism) correlate most strongly with subjective well-
being. The correlation between Locus of Control and health was so apparent
that specific health Locus of Control scales have been developed (see for
example Wallston, Wallston, and DeVellis (1978)). Besides these studies and
our own estimations a large literature on personality helps to interpret our
results.
We devote one section of the paper to review the meanings and roles played
by the different personality constructs. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and
Kautz (2011) interpret personality as a “strategy function for responding to
life situations” (p. 8). To deal with the large pool of life situations humans
pick from an even larger pool of strategies; the fact that their choices are
correlated makes it possible to aggregate them into personality traits: Those
who enjoy art, for example, are also more likely to try out foreign food, those
who value punctuality tend to also prefer hierarchical structures and strive
for achievement.
Several papers have highlighted the importance of such preference clusters.
Especially Conscientiousness (Salgado (1997), Barrick and Mount (1991)),
Neuroticism (Nyhus and Pons (2005), Salgado (1997)) and Locus of Control
(Heckman et al., 2006) correlate with labour market outcomes. Depend-
ing on the outcome variable, correlations with other domains are reported.
Rothmann and Coetzer (2003), for example, find a strong positive correla-
tion between Openness and management performance in a pharmaceutical
company. Heckman et al. (2006) estimate that through direct and indi-
rect channels (like educational attainment) non-cognitive abilities account
for as much variation in adult earnings as cognitive ability. Becker, Deckers,
Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse (2012) argue that personality traits complement
the classical economic measures like trust or risk aversion in explaining eco-
nomic behaviour.
1The assumptions are: average starting wage of 42, 000 EUR (46, 872$ at current
exchange rate), zero wage growth, a 3.5% discount rate and a forty year working life.
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Our results also contribute to the literature on the stability of personality
traits and personality change. Roberts et al. (2006) argue that while per-
sonality traits are fundamentally consistent across time and age2 mean-level
changes occur and are triggered by certain experiences such as leaving the
parental home or starting a career. Our results support this viewpoint.
In the economics literature, however, personality has been regarded as rela-
tively stable. As an assumption this allows studying the impact of person-
ality on economic outcomes, but if it is not fulfilled it can lead to biased
conclusions (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012). Using the Australian Household,
Income and Labour survey (HILDA), Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2013) do not
find large mean-level changes for the Big 5, and also Locus of Control (Cobb-
Clark & Schurer, 2012), in response to adverse life events over a period of
four years. Sahm (2012) uses the American Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) to investigate risk tolerance over a period of ten years (1992-2002)
and finds that individual life events only play a minor role. The literature on
the effectiveness of early childhood intervention, however, recognizes person-
ality changes as an important channel (Heckman, Pinto, & Savelyev, 2012)
of such programs. So far, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence
on the stability of personality following a more experimental approach in the
economics literature.
Our results can partially explain why international education has become
increasingly popular both with students and policy makers, why universities
have invested in student exchange-programmes, and institutions like the Eu-
ropean Union have implemented policies that offer students organisational
and financial support to study abroad.3 Our findings contribute to the litera-
ture on education new evidence on a specific merit of international education
which may be relevant for policy evaluations and can be used to calibrate
structural parameters in models like Bergerhoff et al. (2013) that model hu-
man capital formation through education.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the
measures of personality which are used in this study. Thereafter, we present
our data and the results. Then, we discuss the magnitude of the effects found
and conclude.
2Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) show that rank-order-consistency, measuring changes
of the individual rankings in the population wide distribution of a trait, increases from
0.31 in children to 0.54 during the college years to 0.74 between the ages of 50 and 70.
3Indeed, Vossensteyn, Lanzendorf, and Souto-Otero (2008) in a report for the Euro-
pean Commission evaluating the ERASMUS Programme summarise: “At the individual
level previous studies indicated that the ERASMUS experience has had an effect on the
nature of graduate careers. . . The effect on academic development is detected, but partic-
ularly personal development. . . is recognised by participants.” (p. 10)
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3.3 Personality Measures
Personality measures can be seen as clusters that comprise many individual
traits elicited by individual questions like: Do you enjoy trying foreign food?
For each domain of the Big 5 inventory participants needed to indicate how
much they agree with 12 statements about themselves on a five-point Likert
Scale. Psychologists have assorted these preferences into separate clusters of
traits that correlate strongly with one another (convergent validity) and little
with components from other clusters (discriminatory validity). While there
are various competing frameworks, many psychologists nowadays use the
Big 5, a set of traits including Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism, developed by Costa Jr and
McCrae (1989).
In the following we present a brief syntheses of the literature on the per-
sonality traits we use in our analysis. Individuals with high Openness to
experience (or Intellect) are imaginative, aesthetically sensitive and have a
rich emotional life. They are intellectually curious, have a need for variety
and tend to be undogmatic and behaviourally flexible (McCrae and Costa
(1989), McCrae and Costa Jr (1985)). Empirical results linking Openness to
labour market outcomes are mixed. Dunn, Mount, Barrick, and Ones (1995)
report that from the perspective of recruiters Openness was considered im-
portant only for jobs which needed some degree of creativity.4 Rothmann
and Coetzer (2003) find a positive correlation between Openness and manage-
ment performance, but not with creativity or task performance. Barrick and
Mount (1991) find that Openness is positively associated with job training
performance ratings, but do not find a strong association with job perfor-
mance.
Conscientiousness (or Will to Achieve) refers to the personal need for or-
ganisation (i.e. punctuality, hierarchy etc.), persistence and achievement.
The American Psychology Association dictionary describes it as the “ten-
dency to be organised, responsible and hard-working.”’ Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, Conscientiousness has been found to be a strong, positive predictor of
job performance and labour-market outcomes (Barrick and Mount (1991),
Salgado (1997), Nyhus and Pons (2005)). The ability to delay gratifica-
tion, a component of Conscientiousness, for example predicts a large range
of life time outcomes including health, happiness and educational attainment
(Almlund et al., 2011); a channel through which part of the effect may be
transmitted. Heckman, Humphries, Urzua, and Veramendi (2011) suggest in
a working paper that much of the correlation with job performances should
be moderated by educational attainment.
Extraversion (or Surgency) measures individual traits such as sociability,
activity, dominance, and the tendency to be enthusiastic and experience pos-
4In their paper these occupations were journalist and medical technologist.
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itive emotions (McCrae & Costa, 1989). Extraversion was found to predict
job performance in occupations where success largely depends on social inter-
action like in management and sales (Barrick & Mount, 1991). In their meta
analysis with a focus on sales Vinchur, Schippmann, Switzer III, and Roth
(1998) find that both Extraversion and Conscientiousness predict success in
actual sales better than cognitive ability.
Agreeableness (or Likeability) captures characteristics like sympathy, trust,
cooperation, modesty and altruism. Agreeable subjects tend to be sensitive
and try to maintain harmony in relationships. Becker et al. (2012) find that
unlike other traits Agreeableness is correlated with several economic prefer-
ences such as patience, i.e., discount rates, trust, altruism and with positive
as well as negative reciprocity. Nyhus and Pons (2005) report a negative
correlation between earnings and Agreeableness for women. In contrast,
Rothmann and Coetzer (2003) find a positive correlation between Agree-
ableness and management performance. Barrick and Mount (1991) find that
Agreeableness does not show strong associations to any type of occupation5
investigated.
Neuroticism (or Emotional Instability) describes the tendency to experi-
ence negative emotions such as anxiety, anger, depression and other man-
ifestations of emotional instability (McCrae & Costa, 1989). High scores
of Neuroticism may indicate some form of psychiatric problem. Neuroticism
has been found to be negatively associated with job performance (Nyhus and
Pons (2005), Salgado (1997)). Dunn et al. (1995) find that Neuroticism is
the second most important personality component (after Conscientiousness)
of employability in the eyes of recruiters. A possible explanation for this
could be that subjects scoring high on Neuroticism find it harder to cope
with stressful situation in the workplace.
The type of questions used by psychologists to elicit the Big 5 and Locus
of Control differ substantially. To elicit Locus of Control students needed
pick the, sometimes controversial statement they agreed relatively more with
from a battery of 29 statement couples.
Locus of Control assesses to what extent subjects feel in control of events
in life and how much they attribute to chance, fate, or circumstances. It
originally received attention by economists because of its appearance in the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLSY), where it was used by Heckman et
al. (2006) as a measure for non-cognitive skills. While it was developed
separately from the Big 5, it has been found to correlate with Neuroti-
cism,especially with its sub-construct anxiety (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thore-
sen, 2002). Using data from the German Socio Economic panel, Becker et al.
(2012) find that Locus of Control correlates more strongly with wages than
any of the Big 5 domains.
5Their sample includes professionals (accountants, engineers, teachers etc.), managers,
police, sales and skilled/semi-skilled (i.e. nurses, farmers, clerics etc.) occupations.
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3.4 Data
The Bachelor students at Maastricht University’s School of Business and
Economics (SBE) take a mandatory semester abroad. They choose their
preferred destinations from a long list of possible exchange partners from all
over the world, and depending on their first year average grade their prefer-
ences are fulfilled. Students select to go abroad during the first or the second
semester of their last year. A market like allocation system for exchange
destinations based on first year average grades ensures that semesters are
roughly equally popular.6
The students can choose from the same list of over a hundred SBE partner
universities in 38 different countries. To allocate the places all students are
ranked according to their first-year grade point average and are asked to
submit their top three preferences. If the top preference cannot be fulfilled
because all places at the destination were occupied by students with a higher
ranking, the second preference becomes the new top preference. If this cannot
be satisfied either, the focus shifts to the third preference. Only when none of
the preferred destinations could be offered, the student is pooled with others
without allocation and asked to choose out of the remaining places using the
same procedure as before.
The data was collected over the academic year 2012/2013 via an online survey
to which all economics and business students who were identified as going
abroad by the university’s International Relations Office (IRO) in that year
were invited to. Emails were sent via an official IRO email account to attract
attention, but no information about the purpose of the study was released.
Students were asked to fill in three separate questionnaires at the start, the
middle, and at the end of the year, where every participant who completed all
three surveys was awarded a ten Euro shopping voucher and had opportunity
to request a personality profile in the final questionnaire.
Assuming that the treatment assignment is random or linked to fixed ef-
fects only, this data allows us to study the mean-level personality changes
sparked by the experience of the going-abroad programme. The responses
from students staying a semester longer in Maastricht before their abroad
experience form the control group. This is different from Zimmermann and
Neyer (2013), whose control group consists of students who indicated that
they do not go abroad in the next twelve months. Zimmermann and Neyer
(2013) find that these students differ from the going-abroad group system-
atically in the domains Openness, Conscientiousness and Extraversion. By
6Since our design allows us to take first differences and compare them within and
across both groups, we are not that concerned about minor differences between both
groups. While Maastricht University has not disclosed the full grade distribution to us,
we were informed that the difference of both groups in terms of grades is insignificant,
that is to say, smaller than 0.5 on a grading scale from 1 to 10.
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avoiding such systematic differences our control group resembles the hypo-
thetical counter-factual7 more closely. Zimmermann and Neyer (2013) do
not elicit Locus of Control.
3.5 Results
Figure 3.2 reports the mean values for each personality trait as measured by
the different surveys for each group. We can see some pattern for Neuroti-
cism and Locus of Control in the bottom of the panel. The average value of
Neuroticism decreases for both groups during their study-abroad experience
and increases to a lesser degree during the semester in Maastricht. Fur-
thermore, students on average report a more inward Locus of Control after
their semester abroad. The relation between a more inward Locus of Control
and lower Neuroticism has also been found in other studies (Almlund et al.,
2011).8
Short Long Description
a TraitA2 − TraitA1 Abroad in autumn change
b TraitA3 − TraitA2 Back in Maastricht change
c TraitB2 − TraitB1 Staying first in Maastricht change
d TraitB3 − TraitB2 Abroad in spring change
Table 3.1: The long form notation is Traitit where i ∈ {A,B} and t ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Students with sub-index A study abroad in autumn and stay in
Maastricht during spring. Students with index B do this in reverse order.
The index t refers to the questionnaire where the first, second and third were
administered at the start, middle and end of the academic year respectively.
Before comparing treatment and control outcomes, we check which of the
changes we measured are significantly different from zero. Overall, the pat-
terns of Figure 3.2 are confirmed by the one-sample t-tests shown in Ta-
ble 3.2.9
Students who go abroad report a more inward Locus of Control and lower
Neuroticism afterwards. The change is different from zero at the 5% level of
significance for Neuroticism and below 1% for Locus of Control as shown in
7What would have happened to the personality of students had they not gone abroad
at that time.
8The correlation between Neuroticism and Locus of Control is not obvious as the
metrics used to construct both measures are quite different.
9Throughout the paper all p-values given are two-sided. To avoid confusion with the
short-hand notations a, b, c and d, it is easiest to refer to Figure 3.1 or to Table 3.1 for
the formal definitions.













Openness (mean) Extraversion (mean)
Neuroticism (mean) Agreeabl. (mean)
Conscient. (mean) Loc (mean)
Period
Figure 3.2: Average personality traits at each survey. All values are scaled
by their first period mean, such that all lines start at the value one.
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Trait n1 p ∆ Trait n1 p ∆ Trait n1 p ∆
a&d=0 b=0 c=0
open 78 0.753 -0.13 open 42 0.070 -0.98 open 34 0.14 0.97
consc 80 0.661 0.21 consc 41 0.099 -0.90 consc 34 0.90 -0.09
extra 80 0.220 0.60 extra 42 0.044 -1.02 extra 35 0.52 0.43
agree 78 0.883 -0.06 agree 42 0.924 -0.05 agree 34 0.21 0.82
neuro 79 0.045 -1.14 neuro 40 0.919 0.08 neuro 35 0.30 0.80
loc 80 0.001 1.33 loc 42 0.245 -0.48 loc 35 0.66 -0.23
Table 3.2: Tests whether effects between the two surveys are significantly
different from zero. All p-values given are two-sided. a= Change after being
abroad in autumn (group A), b= Change after staying the spring in Maas-
tricht (group A), c= Change after staying the autumn In Maastricht (group
B), d=Change after being abroad in spring (group B).
the left panel of Table 3.2. The students staying in Maastricht after their
abroad experience are used to analyse the long-term impact of going abroad.
The test for b = 0 in the middle of Table 3.2 cannot reject that these changes
are persistent. During their semester back in Maastricht following the study
abroad semester, Neuroticism for group A increases a little and Locus of Con-
trol becomes slightly less inward. The effect sizes, however, are not that large
and none of them is statistically indistinguishable from zero. If there is mean
reversion it appears to be modest. The third panel of Table 3.2 investigates
whether staying in Maastricht for a semester has any effect in itself. As the
outcome of non-assignment it is the empirical benchmark against which the
study-abroad treatment will be evaluated. It does not hint at any systematic
effects.
For the treatment-control comparison we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis The test assesses the . . .
H1: a=c abroad effect across students at the same time.
H2: c=d abroad effect within students over time.
H3: a&d=c pooled, across and within going abroad effect.
H4: b=c persistance of going abroad effect within students.
H5: a&d=b&c pooled, across and within going abroad effect.
Table 3.3: Summary of the main hypothesis.
What distinguishes this paper from previous work is the possibility to con-
struct a treatment with a control group. We test five hypothesis which are
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summarised in Table 3.3 while the results are presented in Table 3.4. Hy-
pothesis H1 : a = c focusses on the first semester and compares the average
changes in the study abroad group with the changes in the staying in Maas-
tricht group. In the top panel of Table 3.4 using an unpaired, two-sample
t-test, we see a similar pattern and effect size for Neuroticism and Locus of
Control, but little other systematic variation.
The same is found when testing the hypothesis H2 : c = d which only uses
the within subject variation. While effect sizes are similar, they lose some
statistical significance which may be the result of the relatively small sample
size (below 40) in Group B. We again use an unpaired, two-sample test, as we
are working with first differences. Fixed effects between identical individuals,
therefore do not interfere with the independence of both samples. To rule
out interference of higher order effects we later perform paired and partially
tests. The results do not change.
In hypothesis H3 : a&d = c we pool both going abroad semesters and com-
pare them against the effect of staying in Maastricht in the first semester.
Since the effects d and c are derived from the same set of individuals some,
but not all students studied in a&d and c are identical. The t-test signals a
significant reduction of Neuroticism and an inward moving Locus of Control
in the going abroad treatment group.
Given this pattern, hypothesis H4 : b = c tests whether these effects are
persistent. More precisely, it investigates whether the changes felt by group
A in the semester after the study abroad experience are different from the
changes felt by group B in the semester before their study abroad experience.
Like the test for b = 0 in Table 3.2, no strong patterns for Neuroticism or
Locus of Control are detected. In fact, in both groups the effects have the
same sign. Finally, we pool both going-abroad periods and both staying-
in-Maastricht periods and test for equality in hypothesis H5 : a&d = b&c.
Again, we find the same pattern with a significant reduction in Neuroticism
and a significantly more inward Locus of Control in the going-abroad group.
Asking the same individuals at different times points towards using a paired
test. Instead, we present unpaired tests in Table 3.4 because we are already
comparing changes rather than levels. Thus, the correlation from fixed ef-
fects, a major reason for using the paired test,is no longer present. Table
3.5, however, shows paired tests for H2 and H5 and a partially paired test for
H3, where use a correction adjusting for the fact that only the c and d parts
of the sample can be paired. The results point in the same direction with
the reduction in Neuroticism losing some significance. We also asked stu-
dents about their study abroad destinations. Around 61% were heading for
a university outside of Europe, where South-America was the most popular
Non-European destination with a share (among all options) of roughly 25%.
A test whether the study abroad effect was different for students staying in
Europe compared to those studying further away yielded no difference. For
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Hypothesis n1 n2 p µ1 µ2
H1: a = c, abroad effect (A) vs. control (B)
open 49 34 0.142 -0.224 0.971
consc 50 34 0.908 0.020 -0.088
extra 50 35 0.825 0.240 0.429
agree 49 34 0.282 -0.122 0.824
neuro 49 35 0.060∗ -1.122 0.800
loc 50 35 0.022∗∗ 1.420 -0.229
H2: c = d, abroad effect (B) vs. control (B)
open 34 29 0.339 0.971 0.034
consc 34 30 0.554 -0.088 0.533
extra 35 30 0.509 0.429 1.200
agree 34 29 0.381 0.824 0.034
neuro 35 30 0.128 0.800 -1.167
loc 35 30 0.094∗ -0.229 1.167
H3: a&d = c, abroad effect (A,B) vs. control (B)
open 78 34 0.153 -0.128 0.971
consc 80 34 0.724 0.213 -0.088
extra 80 35 0.836 0.600 0.429
agree 78 34 0.258 -0.064 0.824
neuro 79 35 0.044∗∗ -1.139 0.800
loc 80 35 0.018∗∗ 1.325 -0.229
H4: b = c, persistance (A) vs. control (B)
open 42 34 0.022∗∗ -0.976 0.971
consc 41 34 0.357 -0.902 -0.088
extra 42 35 0.085∗ -1.024 0.429
agree 42 34 0.289 -0.048 0.824
neuro 40 35 0.495 0.075 0.800
loc 42 35 0.708 -0.476 -0.229
H5.: a&d = b&c, abroad (A,B) vs. control (A,B)
open 78 76 0.969 -0.128 -0.105
consc 80 75 0.251 0.213 -0.533
extra 80 77 0.132 0.600 -0.364
agree 78 76 0.491 -0.064 0.342
neuro 79 75 0.045∗∗ -1.139 0.413
loc 80 77 0.001∗∗∗ 1.325 -0.364
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4: Testing the hypothesis of Table 3.3. (A) and (B) refer to groups
A and B. Sample sizes n and means µ are presented from left to right. For
H1: a=c this means that n1 is the number of observations for a and n2 is the
number of observations for c. All tests are unpaired and have been performed
assuming an unequal variance using Satterthwaite’s estimate for the degree
of freedoms. Paired and partially paired tests are presented in Table 3.5.
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all traits the hypothesis that the changes were equal could not be rejected
with high p-values.
Hypothesis n1 n2 p µ1 µ2
H2: c = d, abroad (B) vs. control (B): paired
open 29 29 0.459 0.931 0.034
consc 29 29 0.624 0.034 0.690
extra 30 30 0.572 0.333 1.200
agree 29 29 0.776 0.310 0.034
neuro 30 30 0.280 0.567 -1.167
loc 30 30 0.201 -0.167 1.167
H3: a&d=c, abr. (A,B) vs. cont. (B): part. paired
open 78 34 0.144 -0.128 0.971
consc 80 34 0.749 0.213 -0.088
extra 80 35 0.862 0.600 0.429
agree 78 34 0.182 -0.064 0.824
neuro 79 35 0.100 -1.139 0.800
loc 80 35 0.005∗∗∗ 1.325 -0.229
H5: a&d=b&c, abr. (A,B) vs. cont. (A,B): paired
open 70 70 0.890 -0.171 -0.271
consc 70 70 0.393 0.214 -0.514
extra 72 72 0.139 0.792 -0.458
agree 70 70 0.674 -0.143 0.143
neuro 69 69 0.155 -1.101 0.290
loc 72 72 0.005∗∗∗ 1.417 -0.347
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.5: This Table presents paired and partially paired t-tests. A paired
t-test can be applied to account for the dependence between observations
from the same individuals at different points in time. However, we do not
compare individual characteristics, but changes in these. Thus, the depen-
dence one would expect from fixed effects has already been extracted. We
present the paired t-tests as a robustness check against non-linear dependen-
cies.
3.6 The size of the effect
To assess the magnitude of these level changes, Table 3.6 provides the means
and standard deviations of all traits at each point of testing. Locus of Control
always has the lowest standard deviation of all traits. Taking the effect
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open sd consc sd extra sd agree sd neurosd loc sd
1
Male 40.89 6.06 43.42 6.73 41.28 5.79 39.44 6.16 30.11 7.79 11.22 3.48
Fem. 41.00 5.95 45.64 5.69 41.41 6.50 42.69 6.52 34.18 8.58 10.26 3.51
2
Male 40.74 5.85 43.24 7.47 40.93 6.16 39.62 5.00 30.50 7.51 12.20 3.90
Fem. 41.58 5.22 45.64 5.84 42.51 6.58 43.18 5.10 33.00 8.82 10.72 3.98
3
Male 40.38 5.74 42.62 6.31 40.88 5.69 38.86 5.44 30.73 7.98 12.38 4.78
Fem. 40.83 5.88 46.03 5.84 41.57 7.31 43.40 6.12 31.86 8.17 11.27 4.50
Table 3.6: Reports the average values for the different personality domains
and standard deviations for all three surveys.
size from the first panel of Table 3.2 would imply that students on average
obtained a ∆loc = 1.33 points more inward Locus of Control which is about
38% of a pre-treatment standard deviation. For Neuroticism the effect size
is slightly below 15% of one pre-treatment standard deviation.
To obtain an impression about the relevance of our results we investigate
how Neuroticism and Locus of Control are jointly related to productivity
in the work place. We use data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP)10 which includes information on the Big 5 and Locus of Control as
well as on wages which we use as a proxy for productivity and several other
socio demographic characteristics. It also captures economic preferences like
risk aversion, patience, trust, altruism and reciprocity.11 We estimate the
following regression model:
hourlywagei = β0 + β1 loci + β2 big5i + β3 controlsi + i. (3.1)
The estimation results are summarised in Table 3.7. In the first three models
we estimate Equation 3.1 with varying controls. Model 1, the model with the
largest effect sizes, simply regresses hourly wages on the six traits without
further controls.12 A more inward Locus of Control and low Neuroticism
10The GSOEP is a large panel data set that is representative of the German adult
population (Schupp & Wagner, 2002).
11The relationship between the Big 5 and these economic preferences in the SOEP was
investigated by Becker et al. (2012). We use the same data (waves 2003 to 2009) as Becker
et al. (2012) restricting the sample to individuals where information about each trait is
available. The sample size is further reduced by missing data on wages and work hours.
All traits are standardised.
12With the exception of Extraversion the direction of all effects is preserved when more
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage if uni
loc 2.119*** 1.428*** 1.080*** 1.524*
(16.07) (4.88) (3.75) (1.82)
open 1.163*** 1.276*** 0.719** 0.192
(7.96) (3.87) (2.20) (0.21)
consc 0.247* 0.0454 0.293 0.124
(1.70) (0.14) (0.93) (0.15)
extra -1.158*** -0.272 0.103 0.431
(-8.32) (-0.84) (0.32) (0.47)
agree -1.258*** -0.671** -0.681** -1.560
(-9.26) (-2.05) (-2.12) (-1.62)
neuro -1.353*** -0.987*** -0.751** -0.197
(-9.55) (-3.19) (-2.48) (-0.22)
iq 1.353*** 0.822** 0.914
(3.25) (2.00) (0.82)
cons 15.28*** -4.463 -15.52*** -1.217
(126.77) (-1.32) (-4.26) (-0.10)
economic traits No Yes Yes Yes
other controls No Yes Yes Yes
schooling No No Yes No
N 6023 1155 1121 289
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Regression table: Based on SOEP data the table provides re-
gression estimates where hourly wages are the dependent and the six per-
sonality traits discussed are the independent variables (model 1). Model 2
includes control measures for the economic personality traits patience, risk
aversion, trust, altruism and positive/negative reciprocity. It also includes
further controls for gender, age, age2 and for whether the individual lives
in eastern Germany. Furthermore it takes into the account the results of a
short cognitive ability test. Model 3 additionally controls for the secondary
school degree. Model 4 then resticts the sample to those who have attended
university.
3.7. Conclusion 65
are associated with higher hourly wages. Controlling for cognitive ability,13
economic preferences and demographics reduces most individual coefficients
in model 2, but the overall pattern remains unchanged. This is also true when
we include educational attainment in model 3, which is seen as an important
mediator between personality and labour market outcomes by Almlund et
al. (2011). To increase comparability to the Maastricht student population
in model 4 we restrict the sample to respondents holding a university or
technical college degree.14 Due to the lower sample size, standard errors are
pushed up and the statistical significance decreases. Only Locus of Control
remains weakly significant.
Using the coefficients from model 4 we perform a simple calculation to trans-
late the changes in Locus of Control and Neuroticism which we attribute to
the study abroad experience into working productivity using hourly wages as
proxy. Since all trait measures in the regression were standardised, we assess




∗ βloc + ∆neuro
sdneuro
∗ βneuro. (3.2)
The calculation suggests that the personality change following from a half
year study-abroad experience may improve the productivity (as proxied by
hourly wages) of the participating individuals by a magnitude of 2.4%. With
an average starting wage of 42, 000 EUR (46, 872$ at current exchange rate of
1.116 $/EUR) ), zero growth and a discount rate of 3.5% this would amount
to a present monetary value of 21, 525 EUR (24, 022$) over the course of a
forty year working life. If the effect vanished after five years this number
would decrease to 4, 551 EUR (5, 079$).
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence that suggests that investment in per-
sonality is possible. We find that a going-abroad experience changes the
personality of university students by comparing two student groups from the
same programme who go abroad in different semesters. We find that going
abroad leads to a 38% standard deviations more inward Locus of Control
and to 15 % of a standard deviation lower Neuroticism. Both, a more inward
Locus of Control and lower Neuroticism, in the literature are associated with
control variables are included.
13Cognitive ability is measured by a word fluency test (respondents had to name as
many animals as possible in 90 seconds) and by a symbol correspondence test (participants
had to match numbers to as many sings as possible in 90 seconds according to a codebook).
14We do this since the large majority of students that is granted permission to go abroad
at SBE also completes their degree.
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higher subjective well being and better health with some studies suggesting
that, of all traits, Locus of Control and Neuroticism have the highest correla-
tion with these outcomes. Using GSOEP data we confirm previous findings
that a more inward Locus of Control and lower Neuroticism are positively
related to earnings. For a sample of university graduates in the GSOEP
we find that the personality changes measured on average in our treatment
groups would imply an increase in gross wages of about 2.4%. Under some
assumptions this suggests a present monetary value of 21, 525 EUR (24, 022$
at current exchange rate of 1.116 $/EUR). The number would be lower if
the study abroad would eventually fade out. While this number is not in any
way exact, it provides some guidance for the potential economic impact of
a change in non-cognitive abilities that could be achieved by an educational
policy.
There are some limitations to our findings. An important concern would the
sample size in the individual groups. Especially, in the group that stays in
Maastricht before going abroad that serves as a control group the lowest ob-
servations available for a given trait is 34. While the main result that going
abroad groups obtain a more inward Locus of Control and lower Neuroti-
cism appears to be strong despite the low sample size, more subtle points
might have been lost. For example, it would have been interesting to see
how students with different personality profiles ex-ante were affected by the
treatment. The study focussed on a treatment effect for a group who com-
mitted themselves to go abroad and, thus, does not comment on the effect
of international education for groups that do not want to go abroad.
The results help to explain why international education has become in-
creasingly popular as it has become more easily attainable. It also sug-
gests an explanation for the observed international-experience wage premium
(Oosterbeek & Webbink, 2006) that goes beyond a pure signalling effect.
This is also relevant for international communities like the European Union
who encourage students to go abroad hoping to a achieve more integration
between its members. The results may hint that there is an economic div-
idend to policies enabling students to such policies. Our analysis suggests
that studying in another European country has the same effect on student
personality than going away even further.
Non-cognitive abilities have received much attention in recent years. If cogni-
tive and non-cognitive abilities are indeed important complements and non-
cognitive skills can be affected by public policy, then, investment into cogni-
tive as well as non-cognitive abilities would be a logical step. Going abroad
seems to have an effect on the personal development of young adults and,
thus, may be a way of investing in personality.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Locus of Control Statements
1.
a) Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too
much.
b) The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are
too easy with them.
2.
a) Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad
luck.
b) People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3.
a) One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t
take enough interest in politics.
b) There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent
them.
4.
a) In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b) Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognised no
matter how hard he tries.
5.
a) The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b) Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are
influenced by accidental happenings.
6.
a) Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b) Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage
of their opportunities.
7.
a) No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you.
b) People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to
get along with others.
8.
a) Heredity plays the major role in determining one’s personality.
b) It is one’s experiences in life which determine what they’re like.
9.
a) I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
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b) Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a
decision to take a definite course of action.
10.
a) In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such
a thing as an unfair test.
b) Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work
that studying in really useless.
11.
a) Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or
nothing to do with it.
b) Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at
the right time.
12.
a) The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b) This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much
the little guy can do about it.
13.
a) When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b) It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn
out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14.
a) There are certain people who are just no good.
b) There is some good in everybody.
15.
a) In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b) Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a
coin.
16.
a) Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to
be in the right place first.
b) Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has
little or nothing to do with it.
17.
a) As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of
forces we can neither understand, nor control.
b) By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people
can control world events.
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18.
a) Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are con-
trolled by accidental happenings.
b) There really is no such thing as ”luck.”
19.
a) One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b) It is usually best to cover up one’s mistakes.
20.
a) It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b) How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you
are.
21.
a) In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by
the good ones.
b) Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness,
or all three.
22.
a) With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b) It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politi-
cians do in office.
23.
a) Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they
give.
b) There is a direct connection between how hard 1 study and the
grades I get.
24.
a) A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they
should do.
b) A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25.
a) Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that
happen to me.
b) It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an im-
portant role in my life.
26.
a) People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.
b) There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they
like you, they like you.
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27.
a) There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
b) Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28.
a) What happens to me is my own doing.
b) Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction
my life is taking.
29.
a) Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave the way
they do.
b) In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a
national as well as on a local level.
The NEO-FFI Big 5 questions are licensed and therefore cannot be made




Personality and Field of Study
Selection and Personality Change.
4.1 Abstract
Choosing to study a particular subject at university considerably changes
the set of employment possibilities later in life. Personal preferences and
interests could, therefore, be expected to drive subject choice initially, but
they could also change as a result of the specialisation. Using new data
from over 23, 000 German students we find that study choice is influenced by
personality differences. We find significant selection into study fields along
the Big 5 personality traits and a comprehensive set of economic preferences.
However, the personality measures do not show mean or standard deviation
changes as a result of studying a certain subject. If personality plays a role
in subject choice and students stick to that choice due to the opportunity
costs of switching, a sizeable portion of personality based job sorting may
take place just before entering university.
4.2 Introduction
The choice of a university subject has important implications for later life.
Students often find it attractive to look for a job linked to their subject
specialisation, either because a university specialisation increases their pro-
ductivity in that area or (at least) because it signals interest, commitment
and maybe talent for it. Once on the job they acquire more specific human
capital making it even less attractive to switch to other areas. The skills
that are obtained at university through specialisation are an entry card to
professions in which many people choose to stay for all their working life, as
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the cost of switching becomes too high. This makes the choice of a univer-
sity subject, that is arguably at the beginning of the described trajectory, a
significant personal decision.
Electing a field is a free choice that is yet subject to financial, regional and
personal constraints. In a world with perfect information and foresight, high
school graduates would compare all subjects’ costs and benefits given their
specific capabilities and a large vector of personal preferences. A decision
without such perfect information must be based on perceptions, both of one-
self and of the subject, that are also likely to be influenced by personal
characteristics. Thus, if personality plays a role in subject choice and stu-
dents tend to stick to that choice due to the opportunity costs of switching,
a sizeable portion of personality based job sorting may take place not right
after, but just before entering university.
In this paper we investigate the link between personality and field of study.
We want to know whether students majoring in different university subjects
have different personality profiles and whether profiles change over the course
of study. We investigate these questions using a new data set that consists of
more than 23, 000 German students who took part in the study “Fachkraft
2020”. Students were asked to provide details on their study field and took
a comprehensive personality tests. They answered fifty questions from the
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), of which ten at a time were used
to construct the Big 5 character traits Openness, Conscientiousness, Ex-
traversion, Agreeableness and Emotional Stability (Goldberg et al., 2006).1
Moreover, we elicited the economic traits Impatience, Risk Aversion, Trust,
Altruism and Positive and Negative Reciprocity through a set of survey items
that were designed by Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde (2014) to
most closely track the results of incentivised experiments. In our analysis we
compare students at the start of their university career to students further
down the road. We find that both the Big 5 and the economic traits play
an important role when students choose their subject, but that the initial
selection of personality profiles within fields remains unaffected by the length
of study. This is true for the average personality profile of a study as well as
the spread of personality profiles within one study field.
While previous studies have estimated the impact of personality on variables
like the optimal length of education, the actual choice of study is mostly
left out. The few studies that try to estimate the effect exclusively focus on
either the selection into study programs or the change in personality due to
studying a specific subject (Rutkowski and Domino (1975), Boone, van Olf-
fen, and Roijakkers (2004), Lu¨dtke, Roberts, Trautwein, and Nagy (2011),
Schurer, Kassenboehmer, and Leung (2015)). If these studies find signifi-
cant effects, the causality between the field of study and personality remains
1Emotional Stability is the inverse of the trait Neuroticism, which is an item of other
versions of the Big 5.
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unclear. The selection into a certain study track can be influenced by the
personality of students. Once enrolled, the study track might then change
the personality of students. It is, therefore, essential to model these two
effects simultaneously to get an understanding of the inter-linkages between
personality and study field. Moreover, these studies are also limited to ei-
ther the Big 5 personality scores or economic personality traits. Jackson,
Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lu¨dtke, and Trautwein (2012) investigate both se-
lection and personality change for military training in Germany. They find
little change, but considerable selection.
As part of our analysis we present a 10 by 11 table (Table 4.3) that sum-
merises the relation between the ten subject areas and eleven personality
traits. Frey and Meier (2005) find in a large sample that economics students
contribute less to a good course than students of other faculties indepen-
dent of whether they were freshmen at university. From this Frey and Meier
(2005) conclude that the more selfish character traits of economics students
were likely to be the outcome of a selection process. Our evidence supports
this viewpoint. We find that business and economics students differ signif-
icantly in almost all domains compared to the broad average of students:
They show less Trust and Altruism, less Positive and more Negative Reci-
procity. They are less risk averse and more patient, are less aggreeable and
open while being more conscientious and extraverse. On the effect of study-
ing economics the only change we find is actually an increase in Altruism and
(weakly significant) in Agreeableness.2 The strongest individual selection re-
sult is on the positive relationship between studying Pedagogy or Psychology
and being agreeable.
Psychologist offer a range of explanations for why students might select into
subjects which fit their personality. Rutkowski and Domino (1975) find a
link between personality and study skills. With a certain set of study skills
students might, then, choose subjects in which they can benefit from their
specific set of skills. More generally, the tendency to select environments
which suit ones personality is well known in psychology and referred to as a
proactive person-environment transaction. Along these lines Balsamo, Lauri-
ola, and Saggino (2012) find evidence for a link between two Big 5 personality
scores and major choice. Similarly, locus of control has been related to study
field selection (Boone et al., 2004).
With respect to changes in personality psychologists differentiate between
four different types. On a person level, intra-individual changes refer to
changes in the personality scores, while ipsative changes are defined as changes
in the relative weights of the different domains. On a group level, mean-level
changes refer to a shifting of the group mean and rank order changes re-
fer to a change in the ranking of different participants with respect to their
personality (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Group-level changes are our first
2For details please refer to Table 4.4.
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criterion to determine the link between personality and study fields in this
paper. An ongoing shift of the distribution of personality scores of a certain
subject as a result of studying this subject would be equivalent to changes
in the mean level. Additionally, we propose a second measure for change in
personality as the dispersion of the distribution of personality scores within
one subject may change over time. This effect is not widely described in
the psychology literature. Theoretically it can occur without a change in the
mean or the rank order. As a result, the average personality does not change,
but the longer students study, for example, the closer they could move to the
mean personality of their study field. A combination of the two effects is also
possible.
The next section outlines the data used. Thereafter, we explain the method-
ology used in this paper and present the various results. Finally, a last section
concludes.
4.3 Data
The data originates from the German student study “Fachkraft 2020”. It
is collected biannually by the authors and Studitemps GmbH via the Stu-
ditemps student network called Jobmensa. Jobmensa is the largest net-
work for student jobs and internships in Germany with currently more than
400, 000 users. In this paper we use data from the second and the fourth
round which took place between 01.03.2013 - 14.03.2013 and 11.03.2014 -
27.03.2014 respectively. The survey was collected online and was incen-
tivised by giving participants the chance to win Amazon vouchers with a
total value of 1000 Euro for round two and 2000 Euro for round four.3 The
entire Jobmensa network was invited to participate via a first email and a
reminder email one week later. The average time needed to complete the full
questionnaire was 37 minutes for round two and 39 minutes for round four.
During round two a total of 15, 878 students and during round four a total of
21, 728 students participated in the questionnaire. Since participation in the
personality test was made explicitly voluntary4 and some observations had
to be excluded5 the analysis uses 10, 155 observations from round two and
12,985 from round four. Most students participate in only one round so that
the panel dimension of the dataset is small. For this study we will ignore the
3Five Amazon vouchers of 200 Euro for round two and one 500 Euro Amazon voucher,
five 100 Euro Amazon vouchers and twenty 50 Euro Amazon vouchers for round four.
4The personality test came in an extra section after the core questionnaire. Students
were informed that they had finished, but that they would help research and double their
chances to win the lottery if they went on to do the personality test.
5Study field with a too small sample size, age below 16 or above 30, age at entry into
higher education larger 25 years or semesters studied larger 20
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panel dimension and treat the data as a repeated cross-sectional set.6
As noted, the personality test included the fifty item IPIP Big 5 personality
test as well as a module for economic personality traits developed by Falk et
al. (2014). The IPIP test is scored on the five dimensions: Openness, Consci-
entiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional Stability. The eco-
nomic traits included in the module are Impatience, Risk Aversion, Trust,
Altruism and Positive and Negative Reciprocity. All different personality
scores are standardised for the analysis. Study fields are clustered into ten
categories: Business and Economics, Communication and Media, Engineer-
ing, Language and Culture, Law, Math and Computer Science, Medical Sci-
ence, Natural Sciences, Pedagogy and Psychology as well as Social Sciences.
These fields cover all students that participated in the survey except those
studying Sport or Theology, which were dropped due to a small sample size.
It can be argued that the sample is not necessarily representative for German
students as the data was collected through a student job network. Compar-
ing observable characteristics of the sample to another German student sur-
vey called “Sozialerhebung” we cannot find large differences7.8 This is not
only true for demographic variables, but also holds for the share of students
that ever had or currently has a job. The “Sozialerhebung” is collected sys-
tematically on a university level and is funded by the German government
(Middendorff, Apolinarski, Poskowsky, Kandulla, & Netz, 2013). Table 4.1
shows selected descriptive statistics for the two rounds of data collection that
are used for this research and the “Sozialerhebung” respectively.
Variable round two round four Sozialerhebung
Age 21.9 23.0 24.4
Semester studied 4.6 5.7 5.1
Age at university entry 19.6 20.2 21.9
Male-Female ratio 37% / 63% 40% / 60% 42% / 58%
Share of working students 60.4% 63.3% 62%
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
4.4 Methodology
With a total of eleven different personality traits and ten study tracks which
we use in our analysis it is highly likely to obtain significant associations by
6A total of 2455 students participated in both questionnaires
7See also Hartmann, Thiel, and Seegers (2013)
8The somewhat larger difference in age and entry age is mainly driven by the fact that
we chose to drop students older than 30 years and students with an entry age above 25 in
our sample.
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chance. To avoid misinterpretations, we do not study each of the possible
links between study tracks and personality traits separately, but focus on
the share of the significant coefficients and the distribution of the p-values
instead. If the results were only obtained due to sampling variation, the
distribution of p-values would asymptotically converge to a uniform distri-
bution. Hence, finding a distribution with a higher density for lower p-values
suggests an effect of the respective explanatory variables.
To shed more light on the direction of causality, the personality based selec-
tion into study tracks as well changes in personality due to the study track
are estimated simultaneously. If personality change caused by a particular
study field happens over time, it should be the case that students at the very
beginning of their study have not yet changed. Comparing such students
across study fields, then, allows to look at selection effects. Next, as long
as the different student cohorts are sufficiently similar, students in higher
semesters can be compared to students in earlier semesters within the same
subject. We attribute the differences between these students to a change in
personality as a result of studying a certain subject.
A problem arises when trying to estimate three effects simultaneously: age
at entry into higher education, getting older and studying longer. Ideally,
one would like to differentiate between the effect of a student getting older
and that of a student studying a certain subject. However, age at entry
into higher education is an important control variable for two reasons. First,
if personality changes over time it is vital to control for the starting age.
Second, age at university entry carries a lot of information about students.9
Keeping age at university entry means that the model can no longer differ-
entiate between getting older and studying longer.10 Therefore, we define
the age effect as the average effect of studying longer across all subjects. If
a subject deviates from this age effect one can argue for study field specific
personality change.
We propose a model in equation 4.1 in which personality (P ) is explained
by study field dummy terms (F ) and interaction terms between study field
dummies and the semesters studied (S). Note that the constant as well as
a general semester effect is left out. Hence, the procedure is equivalent to
estimating separate regression models for each study field. Additionally, we
use controls variables (C) to test for stability. These are gender, age at entry
into higher education11, the grade point average of the student as well as the
highest parental degree for social status12. Individuals and study fields are
9Conscientious students, for example, are likely to start studying earlier.
10Every variable is a linear combination of the other two.
11age at entry into higher education is demeaned as the constant would otherwise
measure the personality of a student with a hypothetical entry age of zero years.
12the variable is included in the models in quantitative terms, but consists of four
ordinal categories: higher education, meister degree, vocational education and no (known)
education after compulsory schooling
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labeled i, and j respectively. The regression is repeated for each of the Big







γjFijSi + Cij + ij (4.1)
The dummy terms measure personality if semesters studied is equal to zero.
Therefore, we can speak about a significant selection effect if the coefficient of
the study field dummy (βj) is significantly different from the weighted average
(µ) of the dummy terms of all other study fields (k 6= j). Equivalently, a
study field leads to a change in personality if its interaction effect between
field and semesters studied is significantly different from the weighted average
interaction effect. To decide about the significance we construct a t-statistic
as follows:
t =

















Additional to mean level changes in the personality of a certain study field
the spread distribution of personality can change. Even if average personality
stays the same throughout the course of a study it could be true that the
standard deviation changes. A decrease in its dispersion, for example, could
result from students getting closer to the mean personality of their field by
studying longer. To see whether this effect can be found we formulate a
new model in terms of squared differences between individual and average
study field personality rather than only personality itself. By definition this
difference is dependent on the study field. However, the effect of studying
longer on this mean deviations does not need to be the same for different
study fields. Therefore we estimate a equation 4.3 in which this effect is as
well dependent on the study field. The same set of control variables as before
is used.13






φjFijSi + Cij + ij (4.3)
13gender, age at entry into higher education, grade point average of the student and
highest parental degree for social status
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Selection and Mean Level Change
Using the full set of control variables and estimating the regression in equa-
tion 4.1 for each of the eleven traits shows that 53 out of the 110 study field
dummy terms are significantly different from the weighted average of the
remaining dummy terms. Moreover, only eight out of 110 interaction terms
between study field and semesters studied show significant deviations from
the weighted average of the interactions. Hence, there is strong evidence in
favour of selection into study tracks based on personality. Given the signif-
icance level of 5%, however, the few significant findings where study fields
change personality are likely to have emerged by sampling chance. Therefore,
we cannot find evidence that differences in personality between study fields
are generally changing during the course of a study program. Our results,
thus, indicate that the differences in personality originate from the selection
of students into study fields.
This finding is robust across different specifications of the model. Table 4.2
reports the number of significant deviations for the selection and change effect
in different model specifications. Type I models use the full set of control
variables, while type II models use age at entry into higher education as the
only control variable. Models of specification III include no control variables
at all. From the table it can be seen that leaving out some of the control
variables increases the share of significant findings. However, the increase in
the number of significant change effects is too small to argue for a general
effect. Table 4.2 also reports the significance of the control variables. Note
that each of the eleven traits is regressed separately. Each control variable
appears, therefore, in eleven regressions per model specification.
Similar conclusions can be drawn based on the distribution of p-values that
result from testing one coefficient against the weighted average of all other
coefficients. Figure reffig:spc1 shows a histogram of the p-values of both,
the selection as well as change effect for different model specifications. Note
that if scores are drawn randomly from a t-distribution their p-values follow
a uniform distribution. Hence, the strong clustering of points supports se-
lection into study fields, while the rather uniform pattern rejects the idea of
study field specific personality change. This is supported by the results of
testing for a uniform distribution explicitly.14 Still, the distributions for the
change effects are somewhat denser at lower p-values and indeed for speci-
14Categorizing the p-values in 50 categories of equal size allows the application of a
chi-square test for homogeneity to test whether the distributions are indeed uniform. For
the distributions of the p-values in the selection case all specifications lead to a rejection of
a uniform distribution with p-values below 0.01. In the change case a uniform distribution
in specifications I to III cannot be rejected at p-values of 0.86, 0.52, 0.87 respectively.
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fication III 58% of the p-values are lower than 50%. Moreover, half of the
significant change effects can be found in Altruism and Openness throughout
all specifications. Nevertheless, we do not want to argue that the data allows
to detect a general pattern in favour of study field based personality change.
Overall, it can be said that the Big 5 personality traits inform a little more on
the personality based selection of study fields than the economic traits. How-
ever, it should be noted that each of the Big 5 domains carried information
from ten separate questions, while each economic trait only comprised two.
Depending on the model specification the ranking of significant effects dif-
fers. Still, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness seem to be most important
for the selection of study fields. Extraversion and Openness show significant
selection parameters for at least half of the study fields. The importance
of Emotional Stability vanishes as more control variables are added. In the
group of economic traits Altruism, Impatience and Trust are most decisive.
Risk aversion, Negative and Positive Reciprocity are significant less than 40%
of the time. The differences in the selection effects for these traits are picked
up strongly by the control variables.
Trait Specification I Specification II Specification III
Selection Change Selection Change Selection Change
Altruism 6/10 2/10 7/10 2/10 7/10 2/10
Impatience 6/10 0/10 5/10 0/10 6/10 0/10
Neg. Reciprocity 2/10 0/10 4/10 0/10 4/10 0/10
Pos. Reciprocity 3/10 1/10 5/10 1/10 5/10 1/10
Risk Aversion 3/10 1/10 5/10 2/10 6/10 2/10
Trust 6/10 0/10 6/10 1/10 6/10 1/10
Agreeableness 7/10 1/10 10/10 1/10 9/10 1/10
Conscientiousness 7/10 0/10 7/10 1/10 7/10 1/10
Extraversion 6/10 1/10 6/10 1/10 6/10 1/10
Emotional Stability 2/10 0/10 6/10 0/10 7/10 0/10
Openness 5/10 2/10 5/10 3/10 5/10 3/10
Total 53/110 8/110 66/110 12/110 68/110 12/110
Control Variables Specification I Specification II Specification III
Entry Age H.E. 6/11 7/11 -
Gender 9/11 - -
GPA 6/11 - -
Parental Edu. 9/11 - -
Table 4.2: Share of significant deviations of the selection and change effects
as well as share of significant control variables for different model specifica-
tions
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Model III − Change (p−value)
Figure 4.1: Distribution of the p-values of the selection and change effects
for different model specifications
4.5.2 Personality Profiles
Next, we can investigate which personality traits are important for which
study field. Here, we use the model specification with the full set of control
variables. Table 4.3 and 4.4 show the t-scores of the selection and change
effects respectively for all combinations of study fields and personality traits.
We suggest caution when interpreting the change effects as the few signifi-
cant results are likely to have been obtained by chance. Therefore we will
not elaborate on them and they are merely shown for completeness. With
respect to selection, we see more significant effects. Students who decide to
study Pedagogy or Psychology differ from the average student in that they
show greater Positive Reciprocity, are more impatient, risk averse, trusting,
agreeable and open, but less conscientious. Social Sciences attract students
who are more altruistic, impatient, trusting, agreeable and use more Positive
Reciprocity, but are less conscientious than the average student. Students
with positive mean deviations for Altruism, Conscientiousness and Emo-
tional Stability and negative mean deviations for Impatience, Agreeableness
and Extraversion select into Engineering. Law students can be character-
ized by significantly negative t-scores for Altruism, Trust and Agreeableness
as well as significantly positive t-scores for Negative Reciprocity, Conscien-
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tiousness and Extraversion. Communication and Media students are more
extraverse and open, but less altruistic and risk averse. Selection effects for
students in Math and Computer Science show negative deviations in Impa-
tience, Agreeableness and Extraversion. Future medical scientist select into
their field based on high Altruism, Trust and Conscientiousness. Natural
Sciences are chosen by students who are trusting, but not agreeable, consci-
entious or extraverse. The study field Language and Culture shows positive
mean deviations for Impatience and Openness and negative mean deviations
for Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability. Finally, Business and Eco-
nomics students are low on Altruism, Impatience, Positive Reciprocity, Risk
Aversion, Trust, Agreeableness and Openness and high on Negative Reci-
procity, Conscientiousness and Extraversion. We want to stress that while
these effects are significant they are mean effects. Personality per se is a not
a very strong predictor of an individual’s choice of study field.15
15A multinomial logit regression estimating the chosen study field given the Big 5 and




























Altr. Impat. N.Rec. P.Rec. Risk Av. Trust Agree. Consc. Extra. Emot. Open.
Pedagogy/Psych. 1.14 3.10∗∗∗ -1.53 4.15∗∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗ 8.15∗∗∗ -2.49∗∗ 0.82 -0.01 2.66∗∗∗
Social Sc. 2.80∗∗∗ 4.25∗∗∗ -0.27 2.82∗∗∗ 0.88 2.00∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ -4.93∗∗∗ 0.17 -1.61 1.36
Engineering 3.61∗∗∗ -3.32∗∗∗ -1.32 -1.70∗ -1.28 0.19 -4.00∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗ -3.03∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗ -3.75∗∗∗
Law -4.08∗∗∗ 0.40 2.30∗∗ -1.89∗ 1.41 -4.57∗∗∗ -2.36∗∗ 1.86∗ 2.36∗∗ -1.57 0.18
Communic./Media -2.03∗∗ 1.44 -0.39 -0.03 -3.02∗∗∗ 0.08 1.04 -0.90 2.54∗∗ -0.22 3.62∗∗∗
Math/Comp. Sc. 1.42 -2.29∗∗ -1.66∗ -1.23 1.35 0.40 -2.60∗∗∗ 0.52 -3.16∗∗∗ 1.32 -1.45
Medical Sc. 2.03∗∗ -1.17 -1.23 0.72 0.03 2.34∗∗ 1.66∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 0.46 0.59 1.19
Natural Sc. -0.64 -0.13 -0.58 0.69 1.27 2.29∗∗ -2.09∗∗ -2.68∗∗∗ -3.95∗∗∗ -0.14 1.00
Language/Culture 1.43 5.50∗∗∗ 0.94 1.00 1.37 0.30 0.80 -4.98∗∗∗ -1.12 -3.97∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗
Business/Econ. -5.26∗∗∗ -4.47∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗ -2.89∗∗∗ -2.63∗∗∗ -3.89∗∗∗ -2.05∗∗ 5.02∗∗∗ 4.45∗∗∗ 1.59 -3.60∗∗∗
Table 4.3: t-scores of the selection effect for all study field and trait combinations
using the full set of control variables
Altr. Impat. N.Rec. P.Rec. Risk Av. Trust Agree. Consc. Extra. Emot. Open.
Pedagogy/Psych. -0.34 -1.13 -0.44 -1.58 -0.46 1.27 -1.18 0.88 1.61 0.88 -0.64
Social Sc. -2.15∗∗ 0.80 0.77 -1.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.89 -0.60 0.42 -0.14 3.12∗∗∗
Engineering -1.15 0.96 -0.02 -0.86 0.23 -0.07 0.35 -0.86 1.02 -0.07 -0.31
Law 1.60 -1.69∗ 1.08 2.25∗∗ -1.78∗ 0.06 1.10 0.08 1.01 0.35 1.84∗
Communic./Media 1.30 0.93 -1.11 0.47 0.61 0.95 -0.82 -0.71 -1.34 -0.79 0.23
Math/Comp. Sc. -0.50 1.42 0.33 -0.34 -0.37 -0.45 0.40 -1.20 -2.45∗∗ -1.34 -0.59
Medical Sc. -1.05 -0.29 1.13 -0.53 2.18∗∗ -1.87∗ -2.04∗∗ -1.94∗ -1.36 -1.08 -1.79∗
Natural Sc. 0.13 0.18 -0.56 0.20 0.89 -1.92∗ -0.38 1.06 -0.60 -0.67 -3.05∗∗∗
Language/Culture -0.78 -1.24 0.07 1.04 -0.15 0.15 0.47 1.22 1.19 0.96 0.58
Business/Econ. 2.56∗∗ -0.54 -0.56 0.88 -0.73 1.07 1.67∗ 1.16 -0.20 1.03 0.23
Table 4.4: t-scores of the change effect for all study field and trait combinations using
the full set of control variables
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Counting the overlaps between study fields in terms of significant positive,
significant negative and no significant deviation also allows us to analyse
whether students selecting into them are similar. However, this only consid-
ers the direction, but not the size of the effect. Table 4.5 shows the amount
of overlaps for the different study field combinations. With eight agreements
respectively, Pedagogy / Psychology and Social Sciences as well as Math /
Computer Science and Natural Sciences are most similar. The least overlap
exists between Language / Culture and Business / Economics for which none
of the effects point in the same direction.
PP SS EN LA CM MC MS NS LC BE
Pedagogy / Psych. * 8 1 1 3 3 4 5 6 1
Social Sc. * 3 3 2 4 7 6 5 1
Engineering * 3 3 7 5 5 4 4
Law * 6 6 5 6 2 6
Communic. / Me-
dia
* 5 5 4 5 4
Math / Comp. Sc. * 5 8 5 3
Medical Sc. * 7 5 2
Natural Sc. * 5 2




Table 4.5: Overlap in effect direction (negative, positive, no significant
difference) for the eleven traits between study fields
4.5.3 Change in Dispersion
In the preceding analysis no mean change in personality as a result of study-
ing could be found, but it could be that the distribution of traits changes in
other ways. For example, students could become more similar over the course
of their study. We estimate equation 4.3 type regression models in which the
deviation between an individuals personality and the average personality of
the respective study field is explained by studying longer. Again, this regres-
sion is repeated for the Big 5 personality traits and the six economic traits.
To test for stability we vary the set of control variables that are included
in the two models. Once more this leads to three different types of models.
Type I models use the full set of control variables, type II models uses entry
age as the only control variable and type III models use no controls.
There are no signs of a general trend in the deviation between individual
and study field mean personality. Across type I models only eleven out of
110 coefficients reveal significant changes in the standard deviation of the
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personality distribution over time. Moreover, from those eleven significant
coefficients four point towards a reduction in standard deviation while seven
show a significant increase. This picture is also robust across different for-
mulations of the models as shown in Table 4.6. We can also see from Figure
4.2 that the p-values show no clear clustering and seem to follow a uniform
distribution.16
Nevertheless, it should be noted that for each of the traits respectively the
coefficients point in the same direction. For no trait both a reduction in the
standard deviation of some fields and an increase for other fields could be
observed. For Altruism and Emotional Stability the results are above what
one would expect at the 5% significance level, with three out of ten study
fields showing a lower standard deviation in Altruism and four out of ten
study fields showing a larger standard deviation in Emotional Stability for
later semesters. Generally, however, there is little evidence that students
approach to or depart from the personality mean of their subject over the
course of their study.
Trait Specification I Specification II Specification III
Significant R : I Significant R : I Significant R : I
Altruism 3/10 3:0 3/10 3:0 3/10 3:0
Impatience 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0
Neg. Reciprocity 2/10 0:2 2/10 0:2 2/10 0:2
Pos. Reciprocity 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0
Risk Aversion 1/10 0:1 2/10 0:2 2/10 0:2
Trust 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0
Agreeableness 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0
Conscientiousness 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0 0/10 0:0
Extraversion 0/10 0:0 1/10 0:1 0/10 0:0
Emotional Stability 4/10 0:4 4/10 0:4 4/10 0:4
Openness 1/10 1:0 1/10 1:0 1/10 1:0
Total 11/110 4:7 13/110 4:9 12/110 4:8
Control Variables Specification I Specification II Specification III
Entry Age H.E. 4/11 5/11 -
Gender 6/11 - -
GPA 5/11 - -
Parental Edu. 5/11 - -
Table 4.6: Share of significant changes in the deviations between individual and
study field mean personality including the direction (R - reduction, I - increase)
for different model specifications
16The null hypothesis of a uniform distribution cannot be rejected for each of the three
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Model III − Change in SD (p−value)
Figure 4.2: Distribution of the p-values of the deviations between individual
and study field mean personality
4.6 Conclusion
Personality is an important driver of labour market outcomes. Past research
has focused on the effect of personality on job sorting (Dohmen & Falk,
2010). This decision, however, is driven by the earlier subject choice. Un-
derstanding the link between personality and study field is therefore crucial
in understanding job sorting. Moreover, it is conceivable that studying a
certain subject affects the personality of students. If this was the case it
would be valuable to know whether such changes are favourable with re-
spect to the student’s future in the labour market. The personality of an
agent defines the environment under which he can operate comfortably. If a
certain subject appeals to students with specific personality traits this may
be because of its particular combination of teaching style, level of abstract-
ness or degree of human interaction. Knowing about student personalities
could therefore also help to improve current education programs by design-
ing them to accommodate their particular group of students or by explicitly
targeting new groups of students. For example, study programs attracting
extravert students may benefit from greater interactiveness. Countries aim-
ing at increasing the share of students in the natural sciences may devise new
programs targeting different student pools.
In this paper we study the relationship between the personality of students
and their field of study. Personality is measured by the Big 5 personality
traits as well as six economic traits. A simultaneous analysis allows to dis-
entangle the selection into a study field due to a certain personality from
the effect of studying a certain subject on the personality. We find strong
evidence for selection into study tracks based on personality, where in the es-
timated models 53 out of 110 selection coefficients deviate significantly from
the weighted average. We cannot confirm a change in personality as a re-
sult of studying a specific subject. Only eight out of 110 change coefficients
differ significantly from the weighted mean. Moreover, we also do not find
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a change in the standard deviation of personality as a result of studying a
certain field. Out of 110 coefficients only four point towards a reduction in
standard deviation while only seven point towards an increase. The findings





In recent years international student mobility has increased. While net host-
ing countries are in a better position to win highly educated students for
their labour force, they face the additional cost of providing the education.
In much of continental Europe these costs are not levied on students, but
are borne by the national tax payers, making them an active topic of debate.
Borrowing some fundamental equations from the Lucas growth model, this
paper addresses the question whether countries benefit from educating inter-
national students. We derive conditions under which international education
has a positive effect on economic growth, overall and in each specific coun-
try. Based on empirically motivated parameter values to calibrate our two-
country model we find that international student mobility increases steady
state growth for both countries on average by 0.013 percentage points. A
small country that is favoured by the inflows of a larger country could expe-
rience an extra growth of 0.049 percentage points. The benefits from interna-
tional education increase when a country tunes its education and migration
policy.
5.2 Introduction
Education is generally viewed as an important determinant for economic
growth. In recent years, international mobility of students in higher educa-
tion has increased substantially and further growth is expected. This raises
the question how the international flows of students will affect economic
growth in general and in particular how it will affect it in those countries
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that either receive or send many students.
The aim of this paper is to develop an endogenous growth model that incor-
porates the international mobility of students and to calibrate the model to
investigate potential growth effects of internationalisation in higher educa-
tion. We do this by constructing a two-country model, in which a fraction of
the students in higher education studies abroad, around the human capital
accumulation equation from Lucas (1988). We assume that the host country
pays the direct costs of the university education. In the literature we look for
plausible values for the parameters and the uncertainty of these estimates.
Based on these we simulate potential growth profiles for countries that send
or receive students. Our main findings are that total growth of both coun-
tries together always increases in steady state. Countries that receive a large
group of foreign students who stay after their study will have a larger than
average steady state growth rate. At the same time countries that receive
a net surplus of students face an immediate negative shock in income when
internationalisation increases. Receiving a large share of international stu-
dents, thus, leads to a lower income at first but will benefit the country in the
long run. This payback period is shorter if the fraction of foreign students
that stay is larger. An international labour market that easily adopts home-
educated foreign students, therefore, complements access for international
students to the universities.
The question how internationalisation in higher education affects economic
growth has important policy implications in the debate about the European
market for higher education. While in countries like Australia, the US and
the UK foreign students pay a fee that covers the costs of higher education,
this is not true for European students that want to study in another European
country. The Bologna agreement has created a common market for higher
education in Europe comparable to the common market that already exists in
the Anglo-Saxon World. There is, however, one main difference between the
two models. Whereas in Anglo-Saxon countries tuition fees differ between
locals/nationals and foreigners (in the US they even differ between in-state
and out-of-state students and in addition between US and foreign students),
this difference does not exist in Europe. Freedom of settlement in Europe
implies that all European students must be treated the same and hence pay
the same tuition fees as domestic students. For the Netherlands, for example,
this implies that all European students pay the Dutch tuition fee of about
1.800 Euros per year. For Germany this means that all European students
can study for free at a number of German universities. Governments are
therefore confronted with the question whether they should promote the
inflow of foreign European students or should make it less attractive for
foreign European students to study in their country, and perhaps encourage
their own students to study abroad.
This paper is related to literature about the returns to education and en-
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dogenous growth. Economists have been capturing the effect of education
on economic growth into a series of growth models, which go back to the
Solow growth model. These models manage to capture a broad range of the
features associated with education, such as positive externalities and oppor-
tunity costs included in Lucas (1988) or the necessary monetary investment
in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Research shows that an investment in
education can be a profitable: in his overview of empirical research McMahon
(2004) finds that the private rate of return on education is around 10 percent
while the social rate of return is around 17 percent for OECD countries. Em-
pirical evidence confirms the positive effect of education on economic growth.
The key driver of this relation is the positive relation between education and
productivity (Mankiw et al., 1992).
The paper also relates to the literature on student mobility. Existing endoge-
nous growth models assume that graduates stay in the country after finishing
their studies. But with increasing globalisation and increasing (student) mo-
bility, graduates do not automatically stay in the country in which they have
been educated. This does not only hold for European students: in particular
the BRIC countries1 have been very active in changing the brain drain into
a brain gain by attracting natives who have been educated abroad, back to
their home-country. On the other hand, part of the international student
population is expected to stay in the host country. This changes human cap-
ital as well as the labour force in a given country and consequently leads to
interesting growth effects. What happens when the net flow of students for a
country is negative? Do all countries benefit from educational globalisation?
These questions can be answered from the analysis of this paper. Similarly,
countries subsidising many foreign students query whether the expected ben-
efits exceed the cost of providing the education. With many students able to
move to their desired place of study, educational protectionism could soon
be a matter of debate.
The analysis in this paper evaluates the assumption that studying abroad
may benefit some students. This could be either because the quality of uni-
versities in another country is better in general, or because the match between
student and university may improve. Internationalization could also enhance
economic productivity because of the cultural experience that students ob-
tain in foreign education as argued by Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008): “The
development of multi-cultural skills are seen as indispensable in a European
Union that strives for full economic integration while preserving the diversity
of its cultures” (p. 110, Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008)). We contribute to
this literature by showing the relevance of the added value of international
education for economic growth. In addition we take both the sending and
the receiving country into account and discuss the relation between interna-
tionalisation of education and internationalisation of the labour market via
1The term refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China.
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migration.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section
3 we discuss the parameter values that we use to simulate the model. The
results of the simulation are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
5.3 The Model
5.3.1 Basic equations
Our model represents a “Solow style” simplification of the Lucas model2
(Lucas, 1988). To model international flows of students we extent the model
by introducing a second country called Foreign, whose variables are marked
by asterisks. Our domestic county is called Home. Production in the model
takes place in a similar fashion as in the original Lucas Model where output
depends on capital and effective workers. The latter consist of the total
labour force L times the share of workers v and the stock of human capital
h:
Y = Kα (vhL)(1−α) (5.1)
Investment into physical capital is derived from a constant savings rate s and
depreciates at a constant rate δ:
K˙ = sY − δK. (5.2)
As in the Lucas model, education is necessary for the creation of human cap-
ital. Imagine a world where there exist three different types of individuals:
Workers (vL), students (uL) and teachers ((1 − u − v)L). Students can ei-
ther receive their education domestically with productivity ρ, or they can go
abroad and receive foreign education. The productivity of such international
education φ is the sum of the domestic productivity in the foreign country
ρ∗ and an international premium . Similarly, φ∗ is the sum of the domestic
productivity ρ and the international premium for foreign students ∗. The
term productivity in this context refers to the rate at which students accu-
mulate new human capital. This parameter could be heterogeneous among
students.
2Lucas (1988) calculates the savings rate endogenously. We assume a constant savings
rate as in Solow (1956). This simplification was inspired by the high quality teaching
material from Christopher D. Carroll, that is available online.
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We assume that the productivities of education are exogenous. This is a
limitation to the model as the rate of internationalisation could have an
effect on the productivities. The direction of this effect, however, is so far
not determined and could be positive as well as negative. For this reason
and to keep the model simple we assume the productivities to be fixed. The
growth of human capital is described as:




;φ = ρ∗ +  and φ∗ = ρ+ ∗. (5.3)
The structure of this equation is same as in Lucas’ model. In fact, when
setting the percentage of students that study abroad i equal to zero, the
equation gives back Lucas’ equation where h˙ = huρ. The difference here
is the term ((1− i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ+Ri∗λ∗φ∗), which is a weighted average of
the different educational productivities. The first element (1 − i)ρ weighs
the domestic productivity of education by the percentage of Home students
enrolling in domestic education. The second term i(1 − λ)φ looks at the
percentage of Home students that decide to obtain education in the foreign
country at productivity φ and return to the Home. Since it can be expected
that students will only study abroad when they benefit from this we assume
that φ = ρ∗ +  > ρ and φ∗ = ρ + ∗ > ρ∗. It is a feature of our model that
students who obtain education in the other country might not return to their
country of origin. The parameter λ captures this probability to stay. The
second term, therefore, only includes those international students in Home’s
human capital growth that also return to the country. The last element
considers the international students from the foreign country that decide to
study and stay in Home. It is additionally weighted by the relative size of
the two countries student populations R = u
∗L∗
uL
. This is important because
if, for example, Foreign was four times the size of Home and had the same
values for i and u, Home would see four times more students coming into
the country than leaving it for education. Overall, this equation introduces
productivity differences and the concept of brain drain and brain gain to
human capital formation.
The original Lucas model does not explicitly distinguish between teachers
and students. A fraction u of the workforce is not working in the productive
sector but puts effort in learning. This fraction u includes both students and
teachers, while ρ is the productivity of teachers and students together. In
our extension we need to distinguish students from teachers, since we assume
that teachers always come from the Home country, while students might also
come from the Foreign country. Our fraction u therefore only refers to the
fraction of students in the population and is thus lower than u in the Lucas
model. Moreover, our ρ refers to the productivity of students in learning and
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will therefore be larger than ρ in the Lucas model which refers to students
and teachers.3
A necessary condition for students to accumulate any human capital is the
availability of teachers. While students and teachers produce human capital
together, we assume that only students can store human capital. Moreover,
we take as given that at any point in time there exists the same ratio between
teachers and students θ in both countries. This assumption enables us to
effectively account for the costs of education and to leave out teachers from
the human capital accumulation equation. Assuming that both countries
have the same teacher student ratio, θ, we define the share of workers as
anybody who is neither a student nor a teacher. As a result, the costs of
education per student will be very similar in the two countries. The share of
workers in the population is then given by
v = 1− u− uθ (1− i+Ri∗) .
Student migration has a direct effect on the population size in both coun-
tries. We look at two different scenarios with respect to the balancing of
migration flows. In the first scenario we assume that the population size
of both countries is constant. Consequently, the growth in the population
through channels other than student migration (the birth rate or migration
of unskilled workers) has to counterbalance the student migration flows. In
the second scenario we will assume that student mobility will cause changes
in the population size of the two countries. Here we assume all other causes
of population growth to be absent. Consequently the country that net re-
ceives most students will face a population growth while the other country
will face a reduction in its population.
5.3.2 Solution









(δ + gh + gL) .
This leads to an output per capita of:
3All labour that is required to build and maintain the universities is counted as teachers
in this model.





s (1− u− uθ (1− i+Ri∗)) 1−αα




Even though this expression may seem complex at first sight its interpretation
is simple. All items which are listed in parentheses are constant. Therefore,
output per capita grows at the same rate as the human capital stock given
by
gh = u ((1− i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ+Ri∗λ∗φ∗) .
Restricting student migration to balance in steady state requires an addi-
tional steady state condition. Ignoring other types of migration, the change
in the Home labour force is the difference between the inflow of international
foreign students who decide to stay in Home after education and the outflow
of the respective Home international students who decide to stay in Foreign:
L˙ = L∗u∗i∗λ∗ − Luiλ






Plugging this condition into the equations above allows us to solve for the
steady state level and growth of Home if student migration is in balance.
5.3.3 The Effects of International Education
Ultimately, this paper seeks to analyse under what conditions international
education is beneficial for a country using steady state output per capita
without internationalisation in higher education as a benchmark. Generally,
two types of effects are conceivable. In the long run, growth effects that lead
to a change in growth of output per capita in steady state are of greatest
interest. They generally follow from changes in the human capital accu-
mulation equation. In the short run, level effects also affect growth rates,
resulting in a lower steady state of capital per effective capita, but their im-
pact on the growth rate is not permanent. In that spirit, level effects lead
to short term increases or decreases in the growth rate while growth effects
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prevail in steady state. To investigate both we compare the steady state
levels and growth without international education with those which include
international education.
Starting with the case in which migration flows balance as a whole we can
derive necessary conditions for internationalisation in higher education to be
beneficial. We reproduce each country’s steady state growth equation for
convenience. Home and Foreign respectively, will experience steady state
growth equal to:









To examine how international education affects the overall growth rate in
both countries we can aggregate the growth rates. Assuming that output
per capita in both countries is comparable, their respective population sizes
can be used as weights. International education increases total growth in the







⇒iρ+ i∗Rρ∗ < iφ+ i∗Rφ∗.
Economic theory would predict that students only go abroad if it is more
productive. If this assumption holds, it is beneficial for both countries to-
gether to open up for international students. The question remains, however,
whether both countries separately benefit from internationalisation. Home
will experience an increase in its growth rate if:
uρ < u ((1− i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ+Ri∗λ∗φ∗) .
Ri∗λ∗φ∗ is always positive. This is not necessarily true for (−i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ
which is positive only if
ρ < (1− λ)φ.
Hence, the domestic productivity must be lower than the international pro-
ductivity times the share of students that returns to Home. If this term is
negative it has to be sufficiently small to make the steady state growth rate
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positive. A negative growth rate is only possible in either Home or Foreign,
but not in both. In general, the country that receives and keeps the smaller
share of foreign students faces a lower growth rate.
The steady state growth rates determine the effects of internationalisation
in the long run. In the short run, however, matters can turn out very dif-
ferently. Immediately after the introduction of international student flows,
the only effect is that the country that receives more students needs more
teachers, while the other country needs fewer teachers. Since we assume the
same teacher to student ratio in both countries, this implies that the aggre-
gate short run effect is zero. For each country individually, however, this
direct effect might be positive or negative depending on whether more or less
members of the labour force are required for teaching.
s(1− u− uθ) 1−αα < s (1− u− uθ(1− i+Ri∗)) 1−αα
⇒i < Ri∗.
To investigate the effects of internationalisation on growth if students migra-
tion leads to changes in the population of both countries a similar analysis is
informative. The steady state growth rate in the home country is now equal
to
gh = u((1− i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ+ iλφ∗)
Growth in both countries together is higher with international education if













Again, this assumes that output per capita is comparable in the two countries
so that population sizes can be used as weights. The term will always be
positive if international students are rational and hence ρ < φ. Moreover,
a country is able to benefit individually from internationalisation in higher
education if it holds that.
uρ < u((1− i)ρ+ i(1− λ)φ+ iλφ∗)
⇒ρ < φ+ λ
1− λ. (5.4)
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This condition is always met if ρ < φ. Moreover, we can see that in the
long run, when migration is balanced, the growth rate increases with the
productivity of education of domestic students in the foreign country. A cer-
tain share of these students returns to Home after graduation. Additionally,
Home benefits by the international premium that Home students in Foreign
gain. This effect increases if more foreign students decide to stay in Home
after education.
Finally, we can have a look at the level effects in the case where student
migration balances.
s(1− u− uθ) 1−αα < s
(







This means that if student flows balance the level effect is no longer depen-
dent on the actual student inflow but on the probability that those students
stay in the country. If the probability that home students stay abroad is
smaller than the probability that foreign students stay in Home, the level
effect is positive in the home country.
5.4 Empirics
5.4.1 Parameter Callibration
In order to apply the model it is essential to evaluate its parameters em-
pirically. The exact share of international students depends on the country
at hand. Within the model the internationalisation rate i is measured in
terms of the share of students which are educated in a foreign country. A
broad comparison of those rates of internationalisation is possible with the
help of a yearly assessment by Eurostat. According to their measurement,
internationalisation within Europe averages 2.9 percent (Statistical Office of
the European Communities, 2012). However, given that not all international
students register in the foreign country, the Eurostat figures are likely to
be under-reported. This becomes visible at the example of the Netherlands,
for which Nuffic collects data on a university level. While Eurostat reports
that 2.3 percent of the Dutch students go abroad, Nuffic (2011) reports a
rate of internationalisation of 7.1 percent. Since the Netherlands are below
the European average in terms of outgoing students in (Statistical Office of
the European Communities, 2012), the simulations are done for international
shares between 5 and 10 percent.
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Data quality is weaker when it comes to the probability to stay in a for-
eign country after graduation. In a recent paper, Bijwaard (2010) suggests
that male study related migrants have a chance of 19 percent to stay in the
Netherlands. For female students the chance is estimated at 26 percent. The
values fluctuate strongly between different countries of origin. Moreover,
these figures might be over reported. The data includes only students who
register in the Netherlands and these have a higher probability to stay than
students which do not even register in the first place. Hence, the probability
to stay used in the simulations is somewhat lower and equal to 15 percent.
To estimate the share of students in the labour force as measured by the
model we consider the working population only. Eurostat data shows that
men in Europe work between 40 and 46 years over their lifetime, while women
work 36 to 44 years (Brugiavini & Peracchi, 2005). Moreover, university
education is supposed to require three to four years for a Bachelor and four
to six years for a Master degree. In reality even more time may be needed
to finish university. Combining this information with the European target
that 40 percent of the population should hold a university degree allows to
calculate scores for the population share of students. These range between
roughly 2.5 percent and 7.5 percent, and hence, 5 percent will be used in the
simulations.
Values for the teacher to student ratio θ can be found on the basis of data
published by the European Commission. Currently, there is a total of roughly
19 million students in Europe, while higher education institutions employ 1.5
million staff members. Hence, θ should be close to 8 percent. This number
neglects workers that work on buildings and equipment for the university
sector.
Suppose there was no international education. Setting i = i∗ = 0, the
human capital accumulation equation would reduce to h˙ = huρ as in the
original Lucas model. The parameter ρ, then, represents the growth of the
human capital stock. In a sense, it is the return on human capital for every
unit of human capital each time period. To evaluate plausible values for ρ
we make use of the vast literature estimating real returns to education. In
their influential review paper, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) estimate
the social return on investments into education to be 10.8 percent. In the
context of our model every unit invested in human capital grows with rate ρ
and every one percent increase in human capital results in a (1− α) percent
increase in output. To obtain an estimate for ρ we hence use that
redu ≈ ρ(1− α)
Setting redu = 10.8 and α =
1
3
gives an estimate for ρ at 15.75 percent. The
return in human capital that is specific to international education is given
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by . This variable is important as it determines the extra learning gains
from international education. Unfortunately, not much conclusive evidence
exists on whether international education holds a return premium. However,
several empirical studies have shown that students spending time abroad
have benefited in terms of improved language skills and better cultural un-
derstanding (Sutton & Rubin, 2004; Freed, 1995). Many verbal accounts,
moreover, suggest that students undergo some personal development when
going abroad. International experience, indeed, catches a wage premium in
the labour market, but currently it is uncertain how much of it is attributable
to selection (Oosterbeek & Webbink, 2006). Applying the same approxima-
tion as above  = 0.02 implies a rate of return premium of about 1.3 percent.
5.4.2 Simulations
The model as formulated can be calibrated to fit many different pairs of
countries. Whenever we compare our findings to an economy with purely
domestic higher education, we name this economy “‘Lucas”’. Whenever we
do this, we mean that we are comparing our results to the simplified version
of the Lucas model rather than with the original. In the following section
we will consider a pair that has the same parameter values except for size,
where we assume that the labour force of the foreign country is initially four
times larger. This setup roughly resembles the cases of Germany and the










Table 5.1: Parameter values used for callibration.
Imagine this two-country world and suppose that international education
does not carry any premium. Given that all parameters are identical with
the exception of population size, we should expect to see a great surplus of
students entering the small country every period of time. Since all students
have the same probability to stay, the small country then faces a positive
migration of well-qualified students as compensation for the initial increase
in the cost of education. Figure 5.1 plots the development of both countries’
income per capita relative to what it would have been without international
education. The left panel assumes that the population size of both countries
5.4. Empirics 101
remains the same, and thus that student migration is offset by exogenous
factors. The small country represented by the thick line initially starts off
at a lower income per capita level. This decrease in GDP per capita equals
−0.084 percent. However, since it enjoys a larger growth rate, it reaches the
no-internationalisation level of income within only four periods. Thereafter,
brain gain leads to constantly higher levels of income than under the non-
international Lucas regime and to 0.034 percent faster growth in steady state.
Table 5.2 gives additional comparative statics for this scenario relative to the
domestic education economy, which, under our parameters for u and ρ, grows
at 0.75 percent in steady state. If more students of the home country study
abroad (i = 0.15) the extra steady state GDP-growth decreases. When the
mobility of foreign students increases (i∗ = 0.15) the steady state growth rate
increases. A simultaneous increase in both mobility rates is more advanta-
geous for the smaller than for the larger country. The same is true for the
percentage students that stay in the country of study. An increase of the frac-
tion of students that remain abroad negatively influences the growth rate,
but the smaller country benefits more from a higher percentage of stayers
than the larger country.
The right panel of Figure 1 shows what happens if the population size of
both countries starts to change due to student mobility. Since for the Home
country GDP growth is now accompanied by a population growth Home
needs much more time to recover from its initial drop, and GDP per capita
will grow slower. The reason for this is that the capital stock only adjusts
gradually to the increased population size. If an increase in the number of
workers would be accompanied by an extra investment in capital, the growth
patterns would look more like in the first panel. Figure 2 shows what hap-
pens in the very long run. With a constant increase in population the smaller
country becomes larger and larger. This means that the mobility flows be-
come more equal. The smaller country has more students and, therefore, also
more students will study abroad. Eventually, the differences in population
size will disappear and the growth effects vanish. It should be stressed that
this result is a consequence of having constant and equal parameter values
for u, i, λ and ρ. If one country, for example, has a higher internationalisation
rate, country sizes will not fully equalise in the long run.
Thus far, in the Figures we have only considered the purely distributional ef-
fects of international education. Figure 5.3 repeats the simulation assuming
an international premium of two percent corresponding to about 1.3 percent
greater returns to education. This corresponds to the penultimate row in ta-
ble 5.2. Relative growth rates of both countries increase across scenarios such
that in either scenario both countries benefit from international education.
Economic growth in the home country increases from 0.034 percentage points
to 0.049 while for the foreign country a lower growth of −.0085 turn into a
faster growth of 0.0044. Based on these parameters economic growth in the
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smaller country would increase with 0.049 percentage points while GDP per
capita would increase with 0.0044 percentage points. The average annual
extra growth in both country therefore equals 0.013 percentage points.
This shows that at the most plausible values of the parameters international
education is beneficial for both countries. Naturally, policy makers can at-
tempt to increase their share of the overall gains, by targeting variables like
the probability to stay through migration policy or by making it easier for
foreign students to start studying. Even if no international premium exists,
international education may be mutually beneficial. This is, for example,
the case when one country has a higher productivity in educating students
than the other country; a relationship we may see between a more and a
less developed country. Under the assumption that only students from the
less developed country want to study and stay in the more developed coun-
try, international education is universally beneficial as shown in Figure 5.4.
Here, the less developed country benefits as the higher human capital of the
students returning from the developed country outweighs the human capital
loss from brain drain. The developed country loses in the short run due to
the higher costs of education, but quickly recovers and gains from the inflow
of talented students later on.
















Figure 5.1: Base Scenario without Labour Adjustments (Left), with Labour
Adjustment (Right)
5.5 Conclusions
In this paper we developed an endogenous growth model to investigate the
effects of internationalisation in higher education on economic growth. In
aggregate, assuming that individual students only go abroad when that is
beneficial to them, in the long run internationalisation is always beneficial
for the two countries together. The distribution of the gains, however, de-
pends on a variety of parameters like the rate of internationalisation and the
probability to stay in a foreign country. While there are cases in which both
countries gain, it is also possible that one country loses.
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NL DE
Rel. to Lucas Init. ∆ (%) Recov. in (t) SS Gr.(%) Init. ∆ SS Gr.
Base L. exog. -0.084 4.00 0.034 0.021 -0.0085
i = 0.15 -0.070 4.00 0.028 0.017 -0.0071
i∗ = 0.5 -0.141 4.00 0.056 0.035 -0.014
i = i∗ = 0.15 -0.126 4.00 0.051 0.032 -0.013
λ = 0.2 -0.085 4.50 0.030 0.021 -0.0075
λ∗ = 0.2 -0.085 2.75 0.049 0.021 -0.012
λ = λ∗ = 0.2 -0.085 3.00 0.045 0.021 -0.011
ρ = ρ∗ = 0.2 -0.085 3.00 0.034 0.021 -0.0085
ρ = ρ∗ = 0.1 -0.085 6.00 0.034 0.021 -0.0085
 = ∗ = 0.02 -0.085 2.75 0.049 0.021 0.0044
 = ∗ = 0.05 -0.085 1.75 0.070 0.021 0.014
Table 5.2: Comparative Statics for the left panel of Figure 5.1. The first
column gives the Initial Change of Output per Capita relative to Lucas. In
the second column we give the time it needs to reach the Lucas’ level of
output per capita again. The third column has the changes in the steady
state growth rate due to internationalisation in percentage points.




















Figure 5.2: Long Run adjustment of per Capita Income and Human Capital
relative to Lucas when Labour is Endogenous.



















Figure 5.3: Scenario with ∗ = 0.02 without Labour Adjustments (Left),
with Labour Adjustment (Right).
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Figure 5.4: Case where countries are unsymmetric in most parameters
except size: ρ = 0.2, ρ∗ = 0.1; i = 0, i∗ = 0.2;λ∗ = 0.2.
This implies that there can be two obstacles for the internationalisation of
university education. First, countries that emphasise short run effects in their
decision making might try to limit access for foreign students. The reason for
this lies in the costs of education which lowers short term output. Second, an
unequal division of the benefits of internationalisation might hamper inter-
national cooperation. When a large fraction of graduates leaves the country
after studying there, net receiving countries may find it more difficult to ben-
efit from international education. At the opposite extreme, if a substantial
fraction of the students stays in the country of study, it will be attractive
for each individual country to promote foreign students to study in their
country. This could lead to a rat race in which countries attempt to get an
as large as possible share of the flow of international students. Considering
long-term growth, a country benefits if it attracts many foreign students who
stay in the country. A policy to open up universities for foreign students is
therefore complementary to a policy to make the labour market attractive




All mistakes are my own.
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